Examples: Emporous admission
Overview
Example appsDecision tables
Rule 30 cellStrike dieWise deferralCurrent supportHeader workPlant attunementCapability routePublish gateProposal admissionCompression admissionQuorum commitAddress admissionDataflow policyDraft admissionCoded matmul admissionUTQC row honestyCalculator protocolRequantization clampJCS NFC admissionTwo-seed barDocs sync// example · Policy decisions
Emporous admission
Decide if Emporous lets an object into a namespace. Each object must come from someone who is allowed to add it there.
Inspired by afflom/emporous. The supply-chain layer over kappa-registry: admission by scope, blast-radius traversal over ComposedOf, and honest measurements.
Pattern: Policy decision, OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point. To write one of your own, follow How to build a policy decision app.
The data in this figure
| Step | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1. Request | namespace, realization, principal, bytes |
| 2. 5 rules | the first that applies decides |
| 3. Answer | permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate |
| 4. Proved | 4 theorems, 35 tests |
- Fingerprint
78d9c1936305610b8432b57c6c96cdae2b337be73db34516ab4bb65cea944653- Acceptance vectors
- 35
- Claims
- 7
Verified by prismpm verify in the pinned SDK when this site was built.
The prompt
This is the whole input. Raw JSON · Open it in the builder · Download the app (.zip)
The prompt 353 lines
{
"schema": "prism/prompt/1",
"goal": "Decide if Emporous lets an object into a namespace. Each object must come from someone who is allowed to add it there.",
"pattern": "policyDecision",
"repository": "afflom/emporous",
"app": {
"name": "emporous-admit-policy",
"title": "Emporous admission",
"purpose": "Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes.",
"fields": [
{
"name": "namespace",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"scoped",
"unscoped",
"conflicted"
],
"means": "whether the namespace names exactly one scope, none, or more than one"
},
{
"name": "realization",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"known",
"unknown"
],
"means": "whether the registry knows the realization the scope names"
},
{
"name": "principal",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"authorized",
"unauthorized"
],
"means": "whether a capability-edge walk reaches the principal from the scope authorization"
},
{
"name": "bytes",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"realizable",
"refused"
],
"means": "whether the realization carries the bytes to a canonical form"
}
],
"outcomes": [
"permit",
"deny",
"not-applicable",
"indeterminate"
],
"meanings": {
"permit": "XACML 3.0 section 7: Permit; the object kappa, the representation kappa and a DerivedFrom edge are written",
"deny": "XACML 3.0 section 7: Deny; StoreError::Rejected and no DerivedFrom edge is written",
"not-applicable": "XACML 3.0 section 7: NotApplicable; the namespace names no scope, so no policy governs it",
"indeterminate": "XACML 3.0 section 7: Indeterminate; the scope cannot be evaluated, because its realization is unknown or the namespace names several scopes"
},
"rules": [
{
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "unscoped"
}
],
"then": "not-applicable",
"why": "crates/admission/src/scope.rs scope_of_namespace: the namespace names no scope, StoreError::NotFound"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "conflicted"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "crates/admission/src/scope.rs: a namespace naming more than one scope is StoreError::Conflict"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "realization",
"op": "is",
"value": "unknown"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "crates/admission/src/admit.rs: the registry does not know the realization, StoreError::NotFound (EA-03)"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "principal",
"op": "is",
"value": "unauthorized"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "crates/admission/src/admit.rs and auth.rs: the principal is not authorized by the scope capability, StoreError::Rejected (EA-05)"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "bytes",
"op": "is",
"value": "refused"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "crates/admission/src/realize.rs: the realization refuses the bytes, StoreError::Rejected"
}
],
"otherwise": "permit",
"otherwiseWhy": "SPEC.md 5.1: the canonical form is ingested on the scope axis and the received bytes at their own kappa, joined by a DerivedFrom edge",
"properties": [
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "principal",
"op": "is",
"value": "unauthorized"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "EA-05: admission into a namespace requires the capability its scope names"
},
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "realization",
"op": "is",
"value": "unknown"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "EA-03: a scope naming a realization the registry does not know is reported as not found"
},
{
"kind": "always",
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "scoped"
},
{
"field": "realization",
"op": "is",
"value": "known"
},
{
"field": "principal",
"op": "is",
"value": "unauthorized"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "admit.rs checks authorization before the realization reads the bytes"
},
{
"kind": "always",
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "unscoped"
}
],
"then": "not-applicable",
"why": "without a scope there is no realization, axis or authorization to apply"
}
],
"examples": [
{
"request": "scoped known authorized realizable",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "scoped known unauthorized realizable",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "scoped unknown authorized realizable",
"response": "indeterminate"
},
{
"request": "unscoped known authorized realizable",
"response": "not-applicable"
},
{
"request": "scoped known authorized refused",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "conflicted known authorized realizable",
"response": "indeterminate"
},
{
"request": "scoped known unauthorized refused",
"response": "deny"
}
]
},
"stakeholders": [
{
"name": "Publisher",
"text": "Admits artefact representations into a namespace and needs each admission addressed by the canonical form its scope selects.",
"concerns": [
"Correct answers"
]
},
{
"name": "Supply-chain auditor",
"text": "Assesses blast radius over ComposedOf and needs every object in a namespace admitted by a principal its capability authorizes.",
"concerns": [
"Proved guarantees",
"Authorized admission"
]
}
],
"concerns": [
{
"name": "Authorized admission",
"text": "No object kappa and no DerivedFrom edge exist for a principal the scope capability does not reach.",
"model": "security"
}
],
"components": [
{
"name": "kappa-registry",
"text": "The pinned upstream registry Emporous imports, whose KappaStore ingests content and resolves edges.",
"kind": "externalSystem"
},
{
"name": "KappaStore",
"text": "The content-addressed store holding objects, representations, scopes and capability edges.",
"kind": "database"
}
],
"threats": [
{
"name": "Unauthorized admission",
"text": "A principal outside the scope capability admits an object into the namespace.",
"stride": "elevationOfPrivilege",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "medium",
"impact": "critical",
"control": {
"name": "Capability-edge walk",
"text": "Admission is denied unless the walk from the scope authorization reaches the principal.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "proof",
"reference": "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds"
},
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "EA-05 features/suites/admission.feature"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Realization chosen in code",
"text": "The admission path names a realization or axis literal instead of reading it from the scope.",
"stride": "tampering",
"asset": "source",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"control": {
"name": "Read from the scope",
"text": "The realization and axis are read from the scope and a literal on the admission path fails the gate.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "EA-03 features/suites/admission.feature"
},
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "cargo xtask audit-parametric"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Unknown realization admitted",
"text": "A scope names a realization the registry does not know and the bytes are admitted unrealized.",
"stride": "tampering",
"asset": "answer",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"control": {
"name": "Not found, not admitted",
"text": "An unknown realization is indeterminate and never permitted.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "proof",
"reference": "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds"
}
]
}
}
],
"quality": [
{
"characteristic": "Security",
"subcharacteristic": "Resistance",
"requirement": "No unauthorized admission",
"text": "No request from an unauthorized principal is permitted.",
"measure": "Unauthorized permits",
"measureText": "Requests with an unauthorized principal that answer permit.",
"threshold": 0
},
{
"characteristic": "Functional suitability",
"subcharacteristic": "Functional completeness",
"requirement": "Every admission condition decided",
"text": "Each admission condition of SPEC.md 6.3 and the namespace conflict has its own answer.",
"measure": "Undecided conditions",
"measureText": "Admission failure conditions no rule decides.",
"threshold": 0
}
],
"journeys": [
{
"stakeholder": "Publisher",
"steps": [
"REQ-001",
"REQ-003",
"REQ-005",
"otherwise"
]
},
{
"stakeholder": "Supply-chain auditor",
"steps": [
"REQ-002",
"REQ-004",
"INV-001",
"INV-003"
]
}
],
"license": "MIT OR Apache-2.0",
"axioms": {}
}What the app claims
Each claim is a row in model/ids.toml, a scenario and a test, and a theorem the Lean kernel checks. The claims are quoted as the model states them.
EA-01The app never answers permit when principal is unauthorizedEA-02The app never answers permit when realization is unknownEA-03The app always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorizedEA-04The app always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscopedEA-05The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it referencesEA-06The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declaredEA-07Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
Pattern
Policy decision: OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point. The answer is one XACML 3.0 decision: permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate. A policy that applies gives permit or deny. If none applies, the answer is not-applicable. If the request cannot be judged, it is indeterminate.
| Pattern | Standard | Answers |
|---|---|---|
| Policy decision | OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point | permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate |
Behavior
A request is namespace, realization, principal, bytes, separated by spaces. The first rule that matches decides. If none matches, the answer is permit. A request over 112 bytes, or in any other form, is answered invalid.
| Rule | When | Answer | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-001 | namespace is unscoped | not-applicable | crates/admission/src/scope.rs scope_of_namespace: the namespace names no scope, StoreError::NotFound |
| REQ-002 | namespace is conflicted | indeterminate | crates/admission/src/scope.rs: a namespace naming more than one scope is StoreError::Conflict |
| REQ-003 | realization is unknown | indeterminate | crates/admission/src/admit.rs: the registry does not know the realization, StoreError::NotFound (EA-03) |
| REQ-004 | principal is unauthorized | deny | crates/admission/src/admit.rs and auth.rs: the principal is not authorized by the scope capability, StoreError::Rejected (EA-05) |
| REQ-005 | bytes is refused | deny | crates/admission/src/realize.rs: the realization refuses the bytes, StoreError::Rejected |
| otherwise | no rule matches | permit | SPEC.md 5.1: the canonical form is ingested on the scope axis and the received bytes at their own kappa, joined by a DerivedFrom edge |
Properties Lean proves
Each property is a theorem about the same definitions the app is built from. It is proved for every request, not only the tested ones.
Properties Lean proves 4 rows
| Property | Statement | Theorem | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| INV-001 | It never answers permit when principal is unauthorized. | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds | EA-05: admission into a namespace requires the capability its scope names |
| INV-002 | It never answers permit when realization is unknown. | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds | EA-03: a scope naming a realization the registry does not know is reported as not found |
| INV-003 | It always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized. | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv003Holds | admit.rs checks authorization before the realization reads the bytes |
| INV-004 | It always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped. | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv004Holds | without a scope there is no realization, axis or authorization to apply |
Architecture
Stakeholders and the concerns each one views the app through (ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010).
| Stakeholder | Who they are | Concerns |
|---|---|---|
| Publisher | Admits artefact representations into a namespace and needs each admission addressed by the canonical form its scope selects. | Correct answers |
| Supply-chain auditor | Assesses blast radius over ComposedOf and needs every object in a namespace admitted by a principal its capability authorizes. | Proved guarantees, Authorized admission |
| Verifier | Anyone who loads the holo, checks its fingerprint and replays its acceptance vectors before trusting an answer. | Integrity of the published app, Refused malformed requests, Proved guarantees |
Concerns
What the stakeholders care about, and the model each is viewed in.
| Concern | What it means | Model |
|---|---|---|
| Authorized admission | No object kappa and no DerivedFrom edge exist for a principal the scope capability does not reach. | security |
| Correct answers | Every well-formed request is answered by the first rule that matches it, or permit when none does, as the spec states. | quality |
| Integrity of the published app | What a visitor runs is the holo the build verified, with its fingerprint and signed provenance beside it. | security |
| Proved guarantees | Each of the 4 properties of the spec holds for every request, proved by the Lean kernel. | quality |
| Refused malformed requests | A request that is not the 4 fields in order, or is longer than 112 bytes, is answered invalid and never guessed. | security |
Components
8 components and 11 edges between them.
| Component | Kind | What it is |
|---|---|---|
| Browser | externalSystem | The visitor's web browser, which loads the page and runs the Emporous admission guest. |
| Emporous admission guest | service | The Core-Wasm guest built from the model: it answers one request of at most 112 bytes with one answer of at most 64. |
| Emporous admission page | staticSite | The page the template publishes: the holo, its fingerprint, its provenance and its acceptance vectors. |
| GitHub Pages | externalSystem | Serves the page and the holo from the repository Pages workflow. |
| kappa-registry | externalSystem | The pinned upstream registry Emporous imports, whose KappaStore ingests content and resolves edges. |
| KappaStore | database | The content-addressed store holding objects, representations, scopes and capability edges. |
| Prism build | cliAdapter | prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins: it checks every theorem, builds the guest and replays every vector. |
| Source repository | externalSystem | The repository that holds the prompt, the model and its gate. |
Design views
The SDK checks each view against the system model and draws it as OPL and PlantUML.
| View | Diagram | Viewpoint |
|---|---|---|
| Deciding a Emporous admission request | opmObjectProcess | Publisher: Correct answers |
| Components of Emporous admission | umlComponent | Verifier: Integrity of the published app |
| Answering a Emporous admission request | umlSequence | Publisher: Correct answers |
| States of the Emporous admission guest | umlStateMachine | Verifier: Refused malformed requests |
Features and journeys
11 features. Each names the definitions that do the work and the tests that accept it. Each stakeholder has one journey.
Features and journeys 11 rows
| Feature | Calls | Accepted by |
|---|---|---|
| When namespace is unscoped, the answer is not-applicable. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule1, EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| When namespace is conflicted, the answer is indeterminate. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule2, EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| When realization is unknown, the answer is indeterminate. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule3, EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| When principal is unauthorized, the answer is deny. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule4, EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| When bytes is refused, the answer is deny. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule5, EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| When no rule matches, the answer is permit. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| A request that is not namespace, realization, principal, bytes in order, separated by single spaces, or is over 112 bytes, is answered invalid. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::dispatch, EmporousAdmitPolicy::decodeField1 | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| It never answers permit when principal is unauthorized. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds |
| It never answers permit when realization is unknown. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds |
| It always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv003Holds |
| It always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped. | EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge | EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv004Holds |
Journeys
The ordered features each stakeholder takes.
| Stakeholder | Steps |
|---|---|
| Publisher | REQ-001 → REQ-003 → REQ-005 → otherwise |
| Supply-chain auditor | REQ-002 → REQ-004 → INV-001 → INV-003 |
| Verifier | refuse → INV-001 → INV-002 → INV-003 → INV-004 |
Security and threat model
13 threats against 4 assets. Each has a STRIDE category, and either a control with evidence or a risk that is accepted on purpose.
Security and threat model 13 rows
| Threat | STRIDE | Asset | Risk | Answered by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Answer that breaks INV-001 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-001: proof EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds |
| Answer that breaks INV-002 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-002: proof EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds |
| Answer that breaks INV-003 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-003: proof EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv003Holds |
| Answer that breaks INV-004 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-004: proof EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv004Holds |
| Granted capability | informationDisclosure | Answer | low likelihood, major impact | No capability granted: gate prism-code check refuses an ungranted guest import |
| Malformed request | tampering | Request bytes | high likelihood, major impact | Strict decoder: gate malformed-request acceptance vectors, replayed in the compiled guest by prismpm verify |
| Oversized request | denialOfService | Request bytes | medium likelihood, minor impact | Bounded request: gate acceptance vectors at the request bound, one byte over it, and at the guest allocation bound, replayed by prismpm verify |
| Realization chosen in code | tampering | Model source | low likelihood, major impact | Read from the scope: gate EA-03 features/suites/admission.feature; gate cargo xtask audit-parametric |
| Substituted holo | spoofing | Published holo | low likelihood, critical impact | Fingerprint and provenance: gate actions/attest-build-provenance in the pages workflow; gate prism-code check of the holo identities in the page |
| Substituted host | spoofing | Published holo | low likelihood, critical impact | accepted: A page cannot defend against its own host. The holo carries signed build provenance a visitor can check, and the app can be rebuilt from its prompt. |
| Tampered model | tampering | Model source | low likelihood, major impact | Regenerated from the prompt: gate prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins; review app/prompt.json |
| Unauthorized admission | elevationOfPrivilege | Request bytes | medium likelihood, critical impact | Capability-edge walk: proof EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds; gate EA-05 features/suites/admission.feature |
| Unknown realization admitted | tampering | Answer | low likelihood, major impact | Not found, not admitted: proof EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds |
Quality
ISO/IEC 25010:2023 requirements. Each has a measure and a threshold that a theorem pins.
Quality 8 rows
| Requirement | Characteristic | Measure | Threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bounded allocation: The guest allocates at most 224 bytes for one request. | Performance efficiency: Resource utilization | Guest allocation bytes | 224 |
| Bounded request: A request over 112 bytes is refused before any field is read. | Performance efficiency: Time behaviour | Request bytes read | 112 |
| Every admission condition decided: Each admission condition of SPEC.md 6.3 and the namespace conflict has its own answer. | Functional suitability: Functional completeness | Undecided conditions | 0 |
| Every property proved: All 4 properties are theorems the Lean kernel checks. | Security: Integrity | Unproved properties | 0 |
| Every request answered: Every request gets an answer: a rule, permit otherwise, or invalid. | Functional suitability: Functional completeness | Unanswered requests | 0 |
| Every vector replays: All 35 acceptance vectors replay in the compiled guest, the shortest 0 bytes long. | Reliability: Faultlessness | Failed vectors | 0 |
| Examples answered as stated: Every one of the 7 examples of the spec is answered as it states. | Functional suitability: Functional correctness | Example mismatches | 0 |
| No unauthorized admission: No request from an unauthorized principal is permitted. | Security: Resistance | Unauthorized permits | 0 |
Compliance
One obligation per standard, each naming its evidence.
| Standard | Subject | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2022 | Architecture description | Architecture::architectureDescriptionHolds |
| ISO/PAS 19450:2015 and OMG UML 2.5.1 | Design views | Design::viewOpmDecide, Design::viewUmlComponents, Design::viewUmlRequest, Design::viewUmlStates |
| ISO/IEC 25010:2023 | Product quality | Quality::qualityModelHolds |
| ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011 and ISO/IEC 27005:2022 | Application security and risk | Security::controlSet |
| OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point | Policy decision | EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge, EmporousAdmitPolicy::encodeAnswer |
| OpenSpec | Requirements | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
| SPDX MIT OR Apache-2.0 | Licensing | EmporousAdmitPolicy::application |
Rendered design views
Written by the SDK from the design records when it verified the app.
design/Design.viewOpmDecide.opl
View: Design::viewOpmDecide
Title: Deciding a Emporous admission request
Viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointPublisherCorrectAnswers
Notation: ISO/PAS 19450:2015 OPM, Prism OPL profile
componentBrowser is an object.
componentEmporousAdmissionGuest is an object.
componentEmporousAdmissionGuest can be stateDeciding or stateIdle.
processDecide is a process.
processEncodeAnswer is a process.
processJudge is a process.
processParseRequest is a process.
componentEmporousAdmissionGuest handles processDecide.
processParseRequest requires componentBrowser.
processEncodeAnswer affects componentBrowser.
processJudge invokes processEncodeAnswer.
processParseRequest invokes processJudge.
processDecide zooms into processParseRequest, processJudge, and processEncodeAnswer, in that sequence.
design/Design.viewUmlComponents.puml
@startuml
' UML 2.5.1 component diagram
' view: Design::viewUmlComponents
' viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp
title Components of Emporous admission
component "componentBrowser" as c0
component "componentEmporousAdmissionGuest" as c1
component "componentEmporousAdmissionPage" as c2
component "componentGitHubPages" as c3
component "componentKappaRegistry" as c4
component "componentKappaStore" as c5
component "componentPrismBuild" as c6
component "componentSourceRepository" as c7
c0 --> c1 : edgeBrowserToEmporousAdmissionGuest
c1 --> c0 : edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToBrowser
c1 --> c4 : edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaRegistry
c1 --> c5 : edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaStore
c2 --> c3 : edgeEmporousAdmissionPageToGitHubPages
c3 --> c0 : edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser
c4 --> c1 : edgeKappaRegistryToEmporousAdmissionGuest
c5 --> c1 : edgeKappaStoreToEmporousAdmissionGuest
c6 --> c1 : edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionGuest
c6 --> c2 : edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionPage
c7 --> c6 : edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild
@enduml
design/Design.viewUmlRequest.puml
@startuml
' UML 2.5.1 sequence diagram
' view: Design::viewUmlRequest
' viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointPublisherCorrectAnswers
title Answering a Emporous admission request
participant "componentBrowser" as p0
participant "componentEmporousAdmissionGuest" as p1
p0 -> p1 : processDecide
p1 --> p0 : processDecide
@enduml
design/Design.viewUmlStates.puml
@startuml
' UML 2.5.1 state machine diagram
' view: Design::viewUmlStates
' viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests
title States of the Emporous admission guest
state "stateAnsweredDeny" as s0
state "stateAnsweredIndeterminate" as s1
state "stateAnsweredNotApplicable" as s2
state "stateAnsweredPermit" as s3
state "stateDeciding" as s4
state "stateIdle" as s5
state "stateRefused" as s6
[*] --> s5
s5 --> s4 : processParseRequest
s5 --> s6 : processParseRequest
s4 --> s2 : processRule1
s4 --> s1 : processRule2
s4 --> s1 : processRule3
s4 --> s0 : processRule4
s4 --> s0 : processRule5
s4 --> s3 : processOtherwise
s3 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s0 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s2 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s1 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s6 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
@enduml
Prism source
Every file the builder wrote, laid out as a repository created from UOR-Foundation/template. The language packages and Foundation modules every app shares are in the download.
app/src/Architecture.lex.tex 399 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Architecture}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Arch}
\title{architectural component}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: standardIso25010,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 0, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-25010-2023", edition := "2023"})
}
definition{
name: standardIso27005,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 1, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-27005-2022", edition := "2022"})
}
definition{
name: standardIso27034,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 2, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-27034-1-2011", edition := "2011"})
}
definition{
name: standardIso42010,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 4, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-42010-2022", edition := "2022"})
}
definition{
name: stakeholderPublisher,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder {index := 0, name := "Publisher", text := "Admits artefact representations into a namespace and needs each admission addressed by the canonical form its scope selects."})
}
definition{
name: stakeholderSupplyChainAuditor,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder {index := 1, name := "Supply-chain auditor", text := "Assesses blast radius over ComposedOf and needs every object in a namespace admitted by a principal its capability authorizes."})
}
definition{
name: stakeholderVerifier,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder {index := 2, name := "Verifier", text := "Anyone who loads the holo, checks its fingerprint and replays its acceptance vectors before trusting an answer."})
}
definition{
name: concernAuthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 0, name := "Authorized admission", text := "No object kappa and no DerivedFrom edge exist for a principal the scope capability does not reach."})
}
definition{
name: concernCorrectAnswers,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 1, name := "Correct answers", text := "Every well-formed request is answered by the first rule that matches it, or permit when none does, as the spec states."})
}
definition{
name: concernIntegrityOfThePublishedApp,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 2, name := "Integrity of the published app", text := "What a visitor runs is the holo the build verified, with its fingerprint and signed provenance beside it."})
}
definition{
name: concernProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 3, name := "Proved guarantees", text := "Each of the 4 properties of the spec holds for every request, proved by the Lean kernel."})
}
definition{
name: concernRefusedMalformedRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 4, name := "Refused malformed requests", text := "A request that is not the 4 fields in order, or is longer than 112 bytes, is answered invalid and never guessed."})
}
definition{
name: componentBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 0, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "Browser", text := "The visitor's web browser, which loads the page and runs the Emporous admission guest."})
}
definition{
name: componentEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.service), name := "Emporous admission guest", text := "The Core-Wasm guest built from the model: it answers one request of at most 112 bytes with one answer of at most 64."})
}
definition{
name: componentEmporousAdmissionPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.staticSite), name := "Emporous admission page", text := "The page the template publishes: the holo, its fingerprint, its provenance and its acceptance vectors."})
}
definition{
name: componentGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 3, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "GitHub Pages", text := "Serves the page and the holo from the repository Pages workflow."})
}
definition{
name: componentKappaRegistry,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 4, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "kappa-registry", text := "The pinned upstream registry Emporous imports, whose KappaStore ingests content and resolves edges."})
}
definition{
name: componentKappaStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 5, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.database), name := "KappaStore", text := "The content-addressed store holding objects, representations, scopes and capability edges."})
}
definition{
name: componentPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 6, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.cliAdapter), name := "Prism build", text := "prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins: it checks every theorem, builds the guest and replays every vector."})
}
definition{
name: componentSourceRepository,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 7, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "Source repository", text := "The repository that holds the prompt, the model and its gate."})
}
definition{
name: edgeBrowserToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 0, fromIndex := 0, toIndex := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 1, fromIndex := 1, toIndex := 0, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaRegistry,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 2, fromIndex := 1, toIndex := 4, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 3, fromIndex := 1, toIndex := 5, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeEmporousAdmissionPageToGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 4, fromIndex := 2, toIndex := 3, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 5, fromIndex := 3, toIndex := 0, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeKappaRegistryToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 6, fromIndex := 4, toIndex := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeKappaStoreToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 7, fromIndex := 5, toIndex := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 8, fromIndex := 6, toIndex := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 9, fromIndex := 6, toIndex := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 10, fromIndex := 7, toIndex := 6, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: viewpointPublisherCorrectAnswers,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 0, stakeholderIndex := 0, concernIndex := 1, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewpointSupplyChainAuditorAuthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 1, stakeholderIndex := 1, concernIndex := 0, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewpointSupplyChainAuditorProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 2, stakeholderIndex := 1, concernIndex := 3, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 3, stakeholderIndex := 2, concernIndex := 2, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewpointVerifierProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 4, stakeholderIndex := 2, concernIndex := 3, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 5, stakeholderIndex := 2, concernIndex := 4, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewPublisherCorrectAnswers,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 0, viewpointIndex := 0, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewSupplyChainAuditorAuthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 1, viewpointIndex := 1, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewSupplyChainAuditorProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 2, viewpointIndex := 2, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 3, viewpointIndex := 3, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewVerifierProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 4, viewpointIndex := 4, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 5, viewpointIndex := 5, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: componentRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::Component),
body: (cons (componentBrowser) (cons (componentEmporousAdmissionGuest) (cons (componentEmporousAdmissionPage) (cons (componentGitHubPages) (cons (componentKappaRegistry) (cons (componentKappaStore) (cons (componentPrismBuild) (cons (componentSourceRepository) (nil Foundation.Arch::Component)))))))))
}
definition{
name: edgeRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::Edge),
body: (cons (edgeBrowserToEmporousAdmissionGuest) (cons (edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToBrowser) (cons (edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaRegistry) (cons (edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaStore) (cons (edgeEmporousAdmissionPageToGitHubPages) (cons (edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser) (cons (edgeKappaRegistryToEmporousAdmissionGuest) (cons (edgeKappaStoreToEmporousAdmissionGuest) (cons (edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionGuest) (cons (edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionPage) (cons (edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild) (nil Foundation.Arch::Edge))))))))))))
}
definition{
name: viewpointRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint),
body: (cons (viewpointPublisherCorrectAnswers) (cons (viewpointSupplyChainAuditorAuthorizedAdmission) (cons (viewpointSupplyChainAuditorProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp) (cons (viewpointVerifierProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests) (nil Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint)))))))
}
definition{
name: viewRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::View),
body: (cons (viewPublisherCorrectAnswers) (cons (viewSupplyChainAuditorAuthorizedAdmission) (cons (viewSupplyChainAuditorProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp) (cons (viewVerifierProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests) (nil Foundation.Arch::View)))))))
}
definition{
name: edgesKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Arch::Edge)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons edge rest => (((project edge fromIndex) <? count) && (((project edge toIndex) <? count) && (edgesKnown count rest)))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: viewpointsKnown,
parameters: [
stakeholderCount : Nat,
concernCount : Nat,
records : (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint)
],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons viewpoint rest => (((project viewpoint stakeholderIndex) <? stakeholderCount) && (((project viewpoint concernIndex) <? concernCount) && (((project viewpoint modelKindIndex) <? 3) && (viewpointsKnown stakeholderCount concernCount rest))))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: viewMatches,
parameters: [view : Foundation.Arch::View, viewpoints : (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint)],
result: Bool,
body: (match viewpoints
| List.nil => false
| List.cons viewpoint rest => ((((project viewpoint index) =? (project view viewpointIndex)) && ((project viewpoint modelKindIndex) =? (project view modelKindIndex))) || (viewMatches view rest))),
recursive_argument: viewpoints
}
definition{
name: viewsConform,
parameters: [
viewpoints : (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint),
records : (List Foundation.Arch::View)
],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons view rest => ((viewMatches view viewpoints) && (viewsConform viewpoints rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: architectureValid,
parameters: [],
result: Bool,
body: ((edgesKnown 8 (edgeRecords)) && ((viewpointsKnown 3 5 (viewpointRecords)) && (viewsConform (viewpointRecords) (viewRecords))))
}
theorem{
name: architectureDescriptionHolds,
parameters: [],
statement: ((architectureValid) = true),
proof: decide{}
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Compliance.lex.tex 56 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Compliance}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\importmodule{Design}
\importmodule{Quality}
\importmodule{Security}
\importmodule{EmporousAdmitPolicy}
\title{standards reference}
\begin{semanticmodule}
structure{
name: Obligation,
type_parameters: [],
parameters: [],
fields: [
{name: index, type: Nat},
{name: standard, type: String},
{name: subject, type: String},
{name: text, type: String},
{name: evidence, type: (List String)}
]
}
definition{
name: obligations,
parameters: [],
result: (List Obligation),
body: (cons (record Obligation {index := 0, standard := "ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2022", subject := "Architecture description", text := "Stakeholders, concerns, viewpoints and views are declared and their references resolve.", evidence := (cons "Architecture::architectureDescriptionHolds" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 1, standard := "ISO/PAS 19450:2015 and OMG UML 2.5.1", subject := "Design views", text := "Every design view is checked by the SDK against the system model before it is rendered.", evidence := (cons "Design::viewOpmDecide" (cons "Design::viewUmlComponents" (cons "Design::viewUmlRequest" (cons "Design::viewUmlStates" (nil String)))))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 2, standard := "ISO/IEC 25010:2023", subject := "Product quality", text := "Characteristics, subcharacteristics, requirements and measures are numbered and their parents resolve.", evidence := (cons "Quality::qualityModelHolds" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 3, standard := "ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011 and ISO/IEC 27005:2022", subject := "Application security and risk", text := "Every threat has a STRIDE category and a mapped control with evidence, or an accepted risk with its rationale.", evidence := (cons "Security::controlSet" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 4, standard := "OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point", subject := "Policy decision", text := "Every well-formed request is answered with exactly one decision: permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate; a malformed one is invalid, never a decision.", evidence := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::encodeAnswer" (nil String)))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 5, standard := "OpenSpec", subject := "Requirements", text := "Every rule and property of the spec is a requirement with a scenario in openspec/specs.", evidence := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 6, standard := "SPDX MIT OR Apache-2.0", subject := "Licensing", text := "The application and its model are offered under MIT OR Apache-2.0.", evidence := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))}) (nil Obligation))))))))
}
definition{
name: obligationsEvidenced,
parameters: [position : Nat, items : (List Obligation)],
result: Bool,
body: (match items
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item index) =? position) && (match{
branches: [
{body: false, binders: [], constructor: List.nil},
{body: true, binders: [first, others], constructor: List.cons}
],
scrutinee: (project item evidence)
} && (obligationsEvidenced (position + 1) rest)))),
recursive_argument: items
}
theorem{
name: everyObligationEvidenced,
parameters: [],
statement: ((obligationsEvidenced 0 (obligations)) = true),
proof: decide{}
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Design.lex.tex 584 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Design}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\importmodule{Foundation.Arch}
\title{design view}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: processSendRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: processDecide,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processParseRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processEncodeAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processBuildAndVerify,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentPrismBuild"})
}
definition{
name: processRule1,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule2,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule3,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule4,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule5,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processOtherwise,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateIdle,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateDeciding,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateRefused,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredPermit,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredDeny,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredNotApplicable,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredIndeterminate,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: viewOpmDecide,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "Deciding a Emporous admission request", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointPublisherCorrectAnswers", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.opmObjectProcess)})
}
definition{
name: viewUmlComponents,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "Components of Emporous admission", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.umlComponent)})
}
definition{
name: viewUmlRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "Answering a Emporous admission request", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointPublisherCorrectAnswers", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.umlSequence)})
}
definition{
name: viewUmlStates,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "States of the Emporous admission guest", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.umlStateMachine)})
}
definition{
name: opmBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.object), subject := "Architecture::componentBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.object), subject := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: opmDecide,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: opmParseRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: opmJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processJudge"})
}
definition{
name: opmEncodeAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuestIdle,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmState {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", thing := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest", state := "Design::stateIdle"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuestDeciding,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmState {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", thing := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest", state := "Design::stateDeciding"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuestAgent,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.agent), source := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest", target := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: opmBrowserInstrument,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.instrument), source := "Architecture::componentBrowser", target := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: opmParseInvokesJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.invocation), source := "Design::processParseRequest", target := "Design::processJudge"})
}
definition{
name: opmJudgeInvokesEncode,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.invocation), source := "Design::processJudge", target := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: opmEncodeAffectsBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.effect), source := "Architecture::componentBrowser", target := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: opmZoomParseRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", process := "Design::processDecide", subprocess := "Design::processParseRequest", order := 0})
}
definition{
name: opmZoomJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", process := "Design::processDecide", subprocess := "Design::processJudge", order := 1})
}
definition{
name: opmZoomEncodeAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", process := "Design::processDecide", subprocess := "Design::processEncodeAnswer", order := 2})
}
definition{
name: umlBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: umlEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlEmporousAdmissionPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionPage"})
}
definition{
name: umlGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentGitHubPages"})
}
definition{
name: umlKappaRegistry,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentKappaRegistry"})
}
definition{
name: umlKappaStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentKappaStore"})
}
definition{
name: umlPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentPrismBuild"})
}
definition{
name: umlSourceRepository,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentSourceRepository"})
}
definition{
name: umlBrowserToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeBrowserToEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlEmporousAdmissionGuestToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: umlEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaRegistry,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaRegistry"})
}
definition{
name: umlEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeEmporousAdmissionGuestToKappaStore"})
}
definition{
name: umlEmporousAdmissionPageToGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeEmporousAdmissionPageToGitHubPages"})
}
definition{
name: umlGitHubPagesToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: umlKappaRegistryToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeKappaRegistryToEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlKappaStoreToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeKappaStoreToEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlPrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlPrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgePrismBuildToEmporousAdmissionPage"})
}
definition{
name: umlSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild"})
}
definition{
name: seqBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", component := "Architecture::componentBrowser", order := 0})
}
definition{
name: seqEmporousAdmissionGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", component := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest", order := 1})
}
definition{
name: seqRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::UmlMessageKind.synchronous), order := 0, source := "Architecture::componentBrowser", target := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest", process := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: seqReply,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::UmlMessageKind.reply), order := 1, source := "Architecture::componentEmporousAdmissionGuest", target := "Architecture::componentBrowser", process := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: stIdle,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateIdle", initial := true})
}
definition{
name: stDeciding,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateDeciding", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stRefused,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateRefused", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredPermit,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredDeny,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredNotApplicable,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredNotApplicable", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredIndeterminate,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: trAccept,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 0, source := "Design::stateIdle", target := "Design::stateDeciding", trigger := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: trRefuse,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 1, source := "Design::stateIdle", target := "Design::stateRefused", trigger := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: trRule1,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 2, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredNotApplicable", trigger := "Design::processRule1"})
}
definition{
name: trRule2,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 3, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", trigger := "Design::processRule2"})
}
definition{
name: trRule3,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 4, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", trigger := "Design::processRule3"})
}
definition{
name: trRule4,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 5, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", trigger := "Design::processRule4"})
}
definition{
name: trRule5,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 6, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", trigger := "Design::processRule5"})
}
definition{
name: trOtherwise,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 7, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processOtherwise"})
}
definition{
name: trResetPermit,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 8, source := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetDeny,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 9, source := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetNotApplicable,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 10, source := "Design::stateAnsweredNotApplicable", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetIndeterminate,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 11, source := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetRefused,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 12, source := "Design::stateRefused", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Features.lex.tex 137 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Features}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{EmporousAdmitPolicy}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\importmodule{Foundation.Arch}
\title{feature}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: acceptINV001,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds"
}
definition{
name: acceptINV002,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds"
}
definition{
name: acceptINV003,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv003Holds"
}
definition{
name: acceptINV004,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv004Holds"
}
definition{
name: featureRule1,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When namespace is unscoped, the answer is not-applicable.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule1" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule2,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When namespace is conflicted, the answer is indeterminate.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule2" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule3,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When realization is unknown, the answer is indeterminate.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule3" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule4,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When principal is unauthorized, the answer is deny.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule4" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule5,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When bytes is refused, the answer is deny.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule5" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureOtherwise,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When no rule matches, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRefuseMalformed,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "A request that is not namespace, realization, principal, bytes in order, separated by single spaces, or is over 112 bytes, is answered invalid.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::dispatch" (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::decodeField1" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It never answers permit when principal is unauthorized.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV001" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It never answers permit when realization is unknown.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV002" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV003" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped.", calls := (cons "EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV004" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: journeyPublisher,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Journey,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Journey {actor := "Architecture::stakeholderPublisher", steps := (cons "Features::featureRule1" (cons "Features::featureRule3" (cons "Features::featureRule5" (cons "Features::featureOtherwise" (nil String)))))})
}
definition{
name: journeySupplyChainAuditor,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Journey,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Journey {actor := "Architecture::stakeholderSupplyChainAuditor", steps := (cons "Features::featureRule2" (cons "Features::featureRule4" (cons "Features::featureINV001" (cons "Features::featureINV003" (nil String)))))})
}
definition{
name: journeyVerifier,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Journey,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Journey {actor := "Architecture::stakeholderVerifier", steps := (cons "Features::featureRefuseMalformed" (cons "Features::featureINV001" (cons "Features::featureINV002" (cons "Features::featureINV003" (cons "Features::featureINV004" (nil String))))))})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Quality.lex.tex 375 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Quality}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\useglossary{prism.qual@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Qual}
\title{quality measure}
\begin{semanticmodule}
structure{
name: Named,
type_parameters: [],
parameters: [],
fields: [{name: index, type: Nat}, {name: name, type: String}, {name: text, type: String}]
}
definition{
name: characteristicFunctionalSuitability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 0})
}
definition{
name: characteristicPerformanceEfficiency,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 1})
}
definition{
name: characteristicReliability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 2})
}
definition{
name: characteristicSecurity,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 3})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicFaultlessness,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 0, characteristicIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicFunctionalCompleteness,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 1, characteristicIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicFunctionalCorrectness,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 2, characteristicIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicIntegrity,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 3, characteristicIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicResistance,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 4, characteristicIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicResourceUtilization,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 5, characteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicTimeBehaviour,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 6, characteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: requirementBoundedAllocation,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 0, subcharacteristicIndex := 5})
}
definition{
name: requirementBoundedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 1, subcharacteristicIndex := 6})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryAdmissionConditionDecided,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 2, subcharacteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryPropertyProved,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 3, subcharacteristicIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryRequestAnswered,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 4, subcharacteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryVectorReplays,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 5, subcharacteristicIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: requirementExamplesAnsweredAsStated,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 6, subcharacteristicIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: requirementNoUnauthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 7, subcharacteristicIndex := 4})
}
definition{
name: measureExampleMismatches,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 0, requirementIndex := 6, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureFailedVectors,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 1, requirementIndex := 5, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureGuestAllocationBytes,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 2, requirementIndex := 0, threshold := 224})
}
definition{
name: measureRequestBytesRead,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 3, requirementIndex := 1, threshold := 112})
}
definition{
name: measureUnansweredRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 4, requirementIndex := 4, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureUnauthorizedPermits,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 5, requirementIndex := 7, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureUndecidedConditions,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 6, requirementIndex := 2, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureUnprovedProperties,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 7, requirementIndex := 3, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: characteristicNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Functional suitability", text := "Functional suitability, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Emporous admission."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Performance efficiency", text := "Performance efficiency, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Emporous admission."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Reliability", text := "Reliability, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Emporous admission."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Security", text := "Security, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Emporous admission."}) (nil Named)))))
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Faultlessness", text := "Reliability: Faultlessness."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Functional completeness", text := "Functional suitability: Functional completeness."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Functional correctness", text := "Functional suitability: Functional correctness."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Integrity", text := "Security: Integrity."}) (cons (record Named {index := 4, name := "Resistance", text := "Security: Resistance."}) (cons (record Named {index := 5, name := "Resource utilization", text := "Performance efficiency: Resource utilization."}) (cons (record Named {index := 6, name := "Time behaviour", text := "Performance efficiency: Time behaviour."}) (nil Named))))))))
}
definition{
name: requirementNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Bounded allocation", text := "The guest allocates at most 224 bytes for one request."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Bounded request", text := "A request over 112 bytes is refused before any field is read."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Every admission condition decided", text := "Each admission condition of SPEC.md 6.3 and the namespace conflict has its own answer."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Every property proved", text := "All 4 properties are theorems the Lean kernel checks."}) (cons (record Named {index := 4, name := "Every request answered", text := "Every request gets an answer: a rule, permit otherwise, or invalid."}) (cons (record Named {index := 5, name := "Every vector replays", text := "All 35 acceptance vectors replay in the compiled guest, the shortest 0 bytes long."}) (cons (record Named {index := 6, name := "Examples answered as stated", text := "Every one of the 7 examples of the spec is answered as it states."}) (cons (record Named {index := 7, name := "No unauthorized admission", text := "No request from an unauthorized principal is permitted."}) (nil Named)))))))))
}
definition{
name: measureNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Example mismatches", text := "Examples the guest answers otherwise than they state."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Failed vectors", text := "Acceptance vectors whose replay differs from the model."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Guest allocation bytes", text := "Most bytes the guest allocates for one request."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Request bytes read", text := "Longest request the guest decodes, in bytes."}) (cons (record Named {index := 4, name := "Unanswered requests", text := "Acceptance vectors the guest does not answer."}) (cons (record Named {index := 5, name := "Unauthorized permits", text := "Requests with an unauthorized principal that answer permit."}) (cons (record Named {index := 6, name := "Undecided conditions", text := "Admission failure conditions no rule decides."}) (cons (record Named {index := 7, name := "Unproved properties", text := "Properties of the spec without a checked theorem."}) (nil Named)))))))))
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic),
body: (cons (subcharacteristicFaultlessness) (cons (subcharacteristicFunctionalCompleteness) (cons (subcharacteristicFunctionalCorrectness) (cons (subcharacteristicIntegrity) (cons (subcharacteristicResistance) (cons (subcharacteristicResourceUtilization) (cons (subcharacteristicTimeBehaviour) (nil Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic))))))))
}
definition{
name: requirementRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement),
body: (cons (requirementBoundedAllocation) (cons (requirementBoundedRequest) (cons (requirementEveryAdmissionConditionDecided) (cons (requirementEveryPropertyProved) (cons (requirementEveryRequestAnswered) (cons (requirementEveryVectorReplays) (cons (requirementExamplesAnsweredAsStated) (cons (requirementNoUnauthorizedAdmission) (nil Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement)))))))))
}
definition{
name: measureRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure),
body: (cons (measureExampleMismatches) (cons (measureFailedVectors) (cons (measureGuestAllocationBytes) (cons (measureRequestBytesRead) (cons (measureUnansweredRequests) (cons (measureUnauthorizedPermits) (cons (measureUndecidedConditions) (cons (measureUnprovedProperties) (nil Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure)))))))))
}
definition{
name: namesNumbered,
parameters: [position : Nat, names : (List Named)],
result: Bool,
body: (match names
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item index) =? position) && (namesNumbered (position + 1) rest))),
recursive_argument: names
}
definition{
name: parentsKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item characteristicIndex) <? count) && (parentsKnown count rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: requirementsKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item subcharacteristicIndex) <? count) && (requirementsKnown count rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: measuresKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item requirementIndex) <? count) && (measuresKnown count rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: thresholdOf,
parameters: [wanted : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure)],
result: Nat,
body: (match records
| List.nil => 0
| List.cons head rest => (if ((project head index) =? wanted) then (project head threshold) else (thresholdOf wanted rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: qualityValid,
parameters: [],
result: Bool,
body: ((namesNumbered 0 (characteristicNames)) && ((namesNumbered 0 (subcharacteristicNames)) && ((namesNumbered 0 (requirementNames)) && ((namesNumbered 0 (measureNames)) && ((parentsKnown 4 (subcharacteristicRecords)) && ((requirementsKnown 7 (requirementRecords)) && (measuresKnown 8 (measureRecords))))))))
}
theorem{
name: qualityModelHolds,
parameters: [],
statement: ((qualityValid) = true),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureExampleMismatchesThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 0 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureFailedVectorsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 1 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureGuestAllocationBytesThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 2 (measureRecords)) = 224),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureRequestBytesReadThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 3 (measureRecords)) = 112),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUnansweredRequestsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 4 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUnauthorizedPermitsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 5 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUndecidedConditionsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 6 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUnprovedPropertiesThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 7 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Security.lex.tex 607 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Security}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\useglossary{prism.sec@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Sec}
\importmodule{Production.ThreatModel}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\title{security threat}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: assetAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 0, componentIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: assetModelSource,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 1, componentIndex := 7})
}
definition{
name: assetPublishedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 2, componentIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: assetRequestBytes,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 3, componentIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 0})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 1})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 2})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 3})
}
definition{
name: threatGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 4})
}
definition{
name: threatMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 5})
}
definition{
name: threatOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 6})
}
definition{
name: threatRealizationChosenInCode,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 7})
}
definition{
name: threatSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 8})
}
definition{
name: threatSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 9})
}
definition{
name: threatTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 10})
}
definition{
name: threatUnauthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 11})
}
definition{
name: threatUnknownRealizationAdmitted,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 12})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 0, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 0, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 1, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 1, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 2, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 2, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 3, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 3, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 4, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 4, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 5, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 5, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.high), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 6, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 6, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.minor)})
}
definition{
name: riskRealizationChosenInCode,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 7, assetIndex := 1, threatIndex := 7, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 8, assetIndex := 2, threatIndex := 8, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 9, assetIndex := 2, threatIndex := 9, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 10, assetIndex := 1, threatIndex := 10, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskUnauthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 11, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 11, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskUnknownRealizationAdmitted,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 12, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 12, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: controlBoundedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 0, riskIndex := 6})
}
definition{
name: controlCapabilityEdgeWalk,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 1, riskIndex := 11})
}
definition{
name: controlFingerprintAndProvenance,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 2, riskIndex := 8})
}
definition{
name: controlNoCapabilityGranted,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 3, riskIndex := 4})
}
definition{
name: controlNotFoundNotAdmitted,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 4, riskIndex := 12})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 5, riskIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 6, riskIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 7, riskIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 8, riskIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: controlReadFromTheScope,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 9, riskIndex := 7})
}
definition{
name: controlRegeneratedFromThePrompt,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 10, riskIndex := 10})
}
definition{
name: controlStrictDecoder,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 11, riskIndex := 5})
}
definition{
name: controlSet,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ControlSet,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ControlSet {title := "Emporous admission security controls", text := "Emporous admission answers one request with one answer in a Core-Wasm guest granted no capability. Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes.", version := "0.1.0", lastModified := "2026-11-12T18:44:38Z"})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetAnswer", name := "Answer", text := "The answer the guest returns: one of permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate, or invalid."})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetModelSource,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetModelSource", name := "Model source", text := "The prompt, the spec and the LexLean model in the repository, from which the holo is built."})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetPublishedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetPublishedHolo", name := "Published holo", text := "The holo and page the Pages workflow publishes, with its fingerprint and signed provenance."})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetRequestBytes,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetRequestBytes", name := "Request bytes", text := "The bytes a caller sends, at most 112 of them."})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV001", name := "Answer that breaks INV-001", text := "The guest answers permit although principal is unauthorized, which matters because EA-05: admission into a namespace requires the capability its scope names.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV002", name := "Answer that breaks INV-002", text := "The guest answers permit although realization is unknown, which matters because EA-03: a scope naming a realization the registry does not know is reported as not found.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV003", name := "Answer that breaks INV-003", text := "The guest answers deny not when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized, which matters because admit.rs checks authorization before the realization reads the bytes.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV004", name := "Answer that breaks INV-004", text := "The guest answers not-applicable not when namespace is unscoped, which matters because without a scope there is no realization, axis or authorization to apply.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatGrantedCapability", name := "Granted capability", text := "The guest reads, stores or sends data beyond the request it answers.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.informationDisclosure)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatMalformedRequest", name := "Malformed request", text := "A request with a missing, extra, unknown or badly written field is answered as if it were well formed.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.tampering)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatOversizedRequest", name := "Oversized request", text := "A request longer than 112 bytes makes the guest parse or allocate without bound.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.denialOfService)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatRealizationChosenInCode,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatRealizationChosenInCode", name := "Realization chosen in code", text := "The admission path names a realization or axis literal instead of reading it from the scope.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.tampering)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHolo", name := "Substituted holo", text := "A holo other than the one the build verified is served under the app address.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.spoofing)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHost", name := "Substituted host", text := "Something other than the repository Pages workflow serves pages under its address.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.spoofing)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatTamperedModel", name := "Tampered model", text := "The model the holo is built from differs from the reviewed prompt and spec.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.tampering)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatUnauthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatUnauthorizedAdmission", name := "Unauthorized admission", text := "A principal outside the scope capability admits an object into the namespace.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.elevationOfPrivilege)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatUnknownRealizationAdmitted,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatUnknownRealizationAdmitted", name := "Unknown realization admitted", text := "A scope names a realization the registry does not know and the bytes are admitted unrealized.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.tampering)})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlBoundedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlBoundedRequest", name := "Bounded request", text := "dispatch answers invalid for a request over 112 bytes before reading a field, and the guest allocates at most 224.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "acceptance vectors at the request bound, one byte over it, and at the guest allocation bound, replayed by prismpm verify"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlCapabilityEdgeWalk,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlCapabilityEdgeWalk", name := "Capability-edge walk", text := "Admission is denied unless the walk from the scope authorization reaches the principal.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "EA-05 features/suites/admission.feature"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlFingerprintAndProvenance,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlFingerprintAndProvenance", name := "Fingerprint and provenance", text := "The page verifies the holo digests before it runs, and the build signs its provenance as the repository workflow.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "actions/attest-build-provenance in the pages workflow"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "prism-code check of the holo identities in the page"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlNoCapabilityGranted,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlNoCapabilityGranted", name := "No capability granted", text := "prism.toml grants the holo nothing and the model declares capabilitiesEmpty, so a guest import of any host capability is refused.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "prism-code check refuses an ungranted guest import"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlNotFoundNotAdmitted,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlNotFoundNotAdmitted", name := "Not found, not admitted", text := "An unknown realization is indeterminate and never permitted.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV001", name := "Proof of INV-001", text := "It never answers permit when principal is unauthorized. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV002", name := "Proof of INV-002", text := "It never answers permit when realization is unknown. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV003", name := "Proof of INV-003", text := "It always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv003Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV004", name := "Proof of INV-004", text := "It always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv004Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlReadFromTheScope,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlReadFromTheScope", name := "Read from the scope", text := "The realization and axis are read from the scope and a literal on the admission path fails the gate.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "EA-03 features/suites/admission.feature"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "cargo xtask audit-parametric"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlRegeneratedFromThePrompt,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlRegeneratedFromThePrompt", name := "Regenerated from the prompt", text := "The model is written from the prompt by the builder, and the build checks every theorem and replays every vector in the pinned SDK.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.review), reference := "app/prompt.json"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlStrictDecoder,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlStrictDecoder", name := "Strict decoder", text := "Every field is decoded exactly: choices from their list, numbers as plain decimal digits within their bounds, single spaces between fields; anything else is invalid.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "malformed-request acceptance vectors, replayed in the compiled guest by prismpm verify"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: mappingOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatOversizedRequest", controls := (cons "Security::controlBoundedRequest" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingUnauthorizedAdmission,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatUnauthorizedAdmission", controls := (cons "Security::controlCapabilityEdgeWalk" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHolo", controls := (cons "Security::controlFingerprintAndProvenance" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatGrantedCapability", controls := (cons "Security::controlNoCapabilityGranted" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingUnknownRealizationAdmitted,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatUnknownRealizationAdmitted", controls := (cons "Security::controlNotFoundNotAdmitted" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV001", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV001" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV002", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV002" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV003", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV003" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV004", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV004" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingRealizationChosenInCode,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatRealizationChosenInCode", controls := (cons "Security::controlReadFromTheScope" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatTamperedModel", controls := (cons "Security::controlRegeneratedFromThePrompt" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatMalformedRequest", controls := (cons "Security::controlStrictDecoder" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: acceptedSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::AcceptedRisk,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::AcceptedRisk {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHost", rationale := "A page cannot defend against its own host. The holo carries signed build provenance a visitor can check, and the app can be rebuilt from its prompt."})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex 245 lines
\begin{lexlean}{EmporousAdmitPolicy}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Bytes}
\importmodule{Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model}
\title{Text application model}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{name: namespace2Scoped, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: namespace2Unscoped, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: namespace2Conflicted, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 2}
definition{name: realizationKnown, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: realizationUnknown, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: principalAuthorized, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: principalUnauthorized, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: bytesRealizable, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: bytesRefused, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: answerPermit, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: answerDeny, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: answerNotApplicable, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 2}
definition{name: answerIndeterminate, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 3}
structure{
name: Request,
type_parameters: [],
parameters: [],
fields: [
{name: namespace2, type: Nat},
{name: realization, type: Nat},
{name: principal, type: Nat},
{name: bytes, type: Nat}
]
}
definition{
name: byteAt,
parameters: [s : Bytes, i : Nat],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (match (prim index s i : (Option UInt8))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some b => (ctor Option.some [Nat] (prim to_nat b : Nat))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: digitsValue,
parameters: [s : Bytes, i : Nat, acc : Nat, fuel : Nat],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (match fuel
| Nat.zero => (ctor Option.some [Nat] acc)
| Nat.succ rest => (match (byteAt s i)
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some d => (if ((d <? 48) || (57 <? d)) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (digitsValue s (i + 1) ((prim multiply acc 10 : Nat) + (prim subtract d 48 : Nat)) rest)))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext],
recursive_argument: fuel
}
definition{
name: parseDigits,
parameters: [s : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if ((Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s) =? 0) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (if (18 <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (match (byteAt s 0)
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some lead => (if ((lead =? 48) && (1 <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s))) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (digitsValue s 0 0 (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)))))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: parseNumber,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (parseDigits value),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: parseNamespace,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x73636f706564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (namespace2Scoped)) else (if (prim equal value 0x756e73636f706564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (namespace2Unscoped)) else (if (prim equal value 0x636f6e666c6963746564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (namespace2Conflicted)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat]))))
}
definition{
name: parseRealization,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x6b6e6f776e : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (realizationKnown)) else (if (prim equal value 0x756e6b6e6f776e : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (realizationUnknown)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat])))
}
definition{
name: parsePrincipal,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x617574686f72697a6564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (principalAuthorized)) else (if (prim equal value 0x756e617574686f72697a6564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (principalUnauthorized)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat])))
}
definition{
name: parseBytes,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x7265616c697a61626c65 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (bytesRealizable)) else (if (prim equal value 0x72656675736564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (bytesRefused)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat])))
}
definition{
name: sliceOf,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, count : Nat],
result: Bytes,
body: (match (prim slice s start count : (Option Bytes))
| Option.none => 0x
| Option.some part => part)
}
definition{
name: fieldEnd,
parameters: [s : Bytes, i : Nat, fuel : Nat],
result: Nat,
body: (match fuel
| Nat.zero => i
| Nat.succ rest => (match (byteAt s i)
| Option.none => i
| Option.some d => (if (d =? 32) then i else (fieldEnd s (i + 1) rest)))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext],
recursive_argument: fuel
}
definition{
name: decodeField4,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat, v2 : Nat, v3 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseBytes (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v4 => (if (e =? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (ctor Option.some [Request] (record Request {namespace2 := v1, realization := v2, principal := v3, bytes := v4})) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField3,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat, v2 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parsePrincipal (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v3 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField4 s (e + 1) v1 v2 v3) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField2,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseRealization (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v2 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField3 s (e + 1) v1 v2) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField1,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseNamespace (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v1 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField2 s (e + 1) v1) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: rule1,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request namespace2) =? (namespace2Unscoped))
}
definition{
name: rule2,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request namespace2) =? (namespace2Conflicted))
}
definition{
name: rule3,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request realization) =? (realizationUnknown))
}
definition{
name: rule4,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request principal) =? (principalUnauthorized))
}
definition{
name: rule5,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request bytes) =? (bytesRefused))
}
definition{
name: judge,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Nat,
body: (if (rule1 request) then (answerNotApplicable) else (if (rule2 request) then (answerIndeterminate) else (if (rule3 request) then (answerIndeterminate) else (if (rule4 request) then (answerDeny) else (if (rule5 request) then (answerDeny) else (answerPermit))))))
}
definition{
name: encodeAnswer,
parameters: [code : Nat],
result: Bytes,
body: (if (code =? (answerPermit)) then 0x7065726d6974 else (if (code =? (answerDeny)) then 0x64656e79 else (if (code =? (answerNotApplicable)) then 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65 else (if (code =? (answerIndeterminate)) then 0x696e64657465726d696e617465 else 0x696e76616c6964))))
}
definition{
name: dispatch,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: Bytes,
body: (if (112 <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength value)) then 0x696e76616c6964 else (match (decodeField1 value 0)
| Option.none => 0x696e76616c6964
| Option.some request => (encodeAnswer (judge request)))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: application,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::TextApplication,
body: (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::TextApplication {profile := "prismpm/text-application/1", name := "Emporous admission", cargoName := "prism-emporous-admit-policy", cargoVersion := "0.1.0", cargoDescription := "Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes.", cargoRepository := "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/PrismPM", cargoHomepage := "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/PrismPM", libraryRoots := (cons "PrismEmporousAdmitPolicy.EmporousAdmitPolicy.dispatch" (nil String)), acceptanceVectors := (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x64656e79}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x64656e79}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c6963746564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x64656e79}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f706564206b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f706564206b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e73636f70656420756e6b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c6963746564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c6963746564206b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c6963746564206b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c696374656420756e6b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c696374656420756e6b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c696374656420756e6b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x636f6e666c696374656420756e6b6e6f776e20756e617574686f72697a65642072656675736564, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0xff, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f70656420206b6e6f776e2020617574686f72697a656420207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e6b6e6f776e206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a6564207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20756e6b6e6f776e207265616c697a61626c65, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x73636f706564206b6e6f776e20617574686f72697a656420756e6b6e6f776e, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x78787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (nil Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))), entryRoot := "PrismEmporousAdmitPolicy.EmporousAdmitPolicy.dispatch", coreContract := "hologram:guest/core-wasm@1", requestMaximum := (112 : UInt32), responseMaximum := (64 : UInt32), guestAllocationMaximum := (224 : UInt32), capabilitiesEmpty := true, fatArchive := true, primaryLayer := (0 : UInt8), viewLayer := (1 : UInt8), view := (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::TextView {title := "Emporous admission", heading := "Emporous admission", inputLabel := "Request: namespace realization principal bytes", submitLabel := "Decide", outputLabel := "Answer", inputError := "Invalid request", responseError := "Invalid response"})})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex 161 lines
\begin{lexlean}{EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{EmporousAdmitPolicy}
\title{Text application model}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: breaksInv001,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized))) && ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit)))
}
theorem{
name: inv001Holds,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv001 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerDeny,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerIndeterminate,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerNotApplicable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRealizable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRefused,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Conflicted,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Scoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Unscoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalAuthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationKnown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationUnknown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule1,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule2,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule3,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule4,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule5,
breaksInv001
]
},
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: breaksInv002,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request realization) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationUnknown))) && ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit)))
}
theorem{
name: inv002Holds,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv002 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerDeny,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerIndeterminate,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerNotApplicable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRealizable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRefused,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Conflicted,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Scoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Unscoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalAuthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationKnown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationUnknown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule1,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule2,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule3,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule4,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule5,
breaksInv002
]
},
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: breaksInv003,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request namespace2) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Scoped))) && ((project request realization) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationKnown))) && ((project request principal) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized))) && (not ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerDeny))))
}
theorem{
name: inv003Holds,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv003 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerDeny,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerIndeterminate,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerNotApplicable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRealizable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRefused,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Conflicted,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Scoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Unscoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalAuthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationKnown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationUnknown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule1,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule2,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule3,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule4,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule5,
breaksInv003
]
},
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: breaksInv004,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request namespace2) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Unscoped))) && (not ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerNotApplicable))))
}
theorem{
name: inv004Holds,
parameters: [request : EmporousAdmitPolicy::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv004 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerDeny,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerIndeterminate,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerNotApplicable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRealizable,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::bytesRefused,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Conflicted,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Scoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Unscoped,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalAuthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationKnown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationUnknown,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule1,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule2,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule3,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule4,
EmporousAdmitPolicy::rule5,
breaksInv004
]
},
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/lexlean.toml 43 lines
spec = "lexlean/project/1"
name = "prism-emporous-admit-policy"
language = "1.2"
module_prefix = "PrismEmporousAdmitPolicy"
source_roots = ["src"]
entrypoints = ["src/Architecture.lex.tex", "src/Compliance.lex.tex", "src/Design.lex.tex", "src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex", "src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex", "src/Features.lex.tex", "src/Quality.lex.tex", "src/Security.lex.tex"]
build_root = ".lexlean"
lockfile = "lexlean.lock"
lean_workspace = "."
lean_toolchain = "leanprover/lean4:v4.32.1"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "lexlean.std.nat"
kind = "builtin"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "prism.arch"
kind = "path"
path = "language/prism.arch"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "prism.qual"
kind = "path"
path = "language/prism.qual"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "prism.sec"
kind = "path"
path = "language/prism.sec"
[limits]
max_file_bytes = 4194304
max_total_source_bytes = 67108864
max_primitive_atoms = 2000000
max_token_lattice_edges = 4000000
max_parse_states = 4000000
max_ir_nodes = 2000000
max_scope_depth = 1024
max_import_depth = 128
max_diagnostics = 256
max_child_output_bytes = 16777216
child_timeout_ms = 300000
app/prompt.json 354 lines
{
"schema": "prism/prompt/1",
"goal": "Decide if Emporous lets an object into a namespace. Each object must come from someone who is allowed to add it there.",
"pattern": "policyDecision",
"repository": "afflom/emporous",
"app": {
"name": "emporous-admit-policy",
"title": "Emporous admission",
"purpose": "Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes.",
"fields": [
{
"name": "namespace",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"scoped",
"unscoped",
"conflicted"
],
"means": "whether the namespace names exactly one scope, none, or more than one"
},
{
"name": "realization",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"known",
"unknown"
],
"means": "whether the registry knows the realization the scope names"
},
{
"name": "principal",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"authorized",
"unauthorized"
],
"means": "whether a capability-edge walk reaches the principal from the scope authorization"
},
{
"name": "bytes",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"realizable",
"refused"
],
"means": "whether the realization carries the bytes to a canonical form"
}
],
"outcomes": [
"permit",
"deny",
"not-applicable",
"indeterminate"
],
"meanings": {
"permit": "XACML 3.0 section 7: Permit; the object kappa, the representation kappa and a DerivedFrom edge are written",
"deny": "XACML 3.0 section 7: Deny; StoreError::Rejected and no DerivedFrom edge is written",
"not-applicable": "XACML 3.0 section 7: NotApplicable; the namespace names no scope, so no policy governs it",
"indeterminate": "XACML 3.0 section 7: Indeterminate; the scope cannot be evaluated, because its realization is unknown or the namespace names several scopes"
},
"rules": [
{
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "unscoped"
}
],
"then": "not-applicable",
"why": "crates/admission/src/scope.rs scope_of_namespace: the namespace names no scope, StoreError::NotFound"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "conflicted"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "crates/admission/src/scope.rs: a namespace naming more than one scope is StoreError::Conflict"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "realization",
"op": "is",
"value": "unknown"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "crates/admission/src/admit.rs: the registry does not know the realization, StoreError::NotFound (EA-03)"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "principal",
"op": "is",
"value": "unauthorized"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "crates/admission/src/admit.rs and auth.rs: the principal is not authorized by the scope capability, StoreError::Rejected (EA-05)"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "bytes",
"op": "is",
"value": "refused"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "crates/admission/src/realize.rs: the realization refuses the bytes, StoreError::Rejected"
}
],
"otherwise": "permit",
"otherwiseWhy": "SPEC.md 5.1: the canonical form is ingested on the scope axis and the received bytes at their own kappa, joined by a DerivedFrom edge",
"properties": [
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "principal",
"op": "is",
"value": "unauthorized"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "EA-05: admission into a namespace requires the capability its scope names"
},
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "realization",
"op": "is",
"value": "unknown"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "EA-03: a scope naming a realization the registry does not know is reported as not found"
},
{
"kind": "always",
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "scoped"
},
{
"field": "realization",
"op": "is",
"value": "known"
},
{
"field": "principal",
"op": "is",
"value": "unauthorized"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "admit.rs checks authorization before the realization reads the bytes"
},
{
"kind": "always",
"when": [
{
"field": "namespace",
"op": "is",
"value": "unscoped"
}
],
"then": "not-applicable",
"why": "without a scope there is no realization, axis or authorization to apply"
}
],
"examples": [
{
"request": "scoped known authorized realizable",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "scoped known unauthorized realizable",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "scoped unknown authorized realizable",
"response": "indeterminate"
},
{
"request": "unscoped known authorized realizable",
"response": "not-applicable"
},
{
"request": "scoped known authorized refused",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "conflicted known authorized realizable",
"response": "indeterminate"
},
{
"request": "scoped known unauthorized refused",
"response": "deny"
}
]
},
"stakeholders": [
{
"name": "Publisher",
"text": "Admits artefact representations into a namespace and needs each admission addressed by the canonical form its scope selects.",
"concerns": [
"Correct answers"
]
},
{
"name": "Supply-chain auditor",
"text": "Assesses blast radius over ComposedOf and needs every object in a namespace admitted by a principal its capability authorizes.",
"concerns": [
"Proved guarantees",
"Authorized admission"
]
}
],
"concerns": [
{
"name": "Authorized admission",
"text": "No object kappa and no DerivedFrom edge exist for a principal the scope capability does not reach.",
"model": "security"
}
],
"components": [
{
"name": "kappa-registry",
"text": "The pinned upstream registry Emporous imports, whose KappaStore ingests content and resolves edges.",
"kind": "externalSystem"
},
{
"name": "KappaStore",
"text": "The content-addressed store holding objects, representations, scopes and capability edges.",
"kind": "database"
}
],
"threats": [
{
"name": "Unauthorized admission",
"text": "A principal outside the scope capability admits an object into the namespace.",
"stride": "elevationOfPrivilege",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "medium",
"impact": "critical",
"control": {
"name": "Capability-edge walk",
"text": "Admission is denied unless the walk from the scope authorization reaches the principal.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "proof",
"reference": "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv001Holds"
},
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "EA-05 features/suites/admission.feature"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Realization chosen in code",
"text": "The admission path names a realization or axis literal instead of reading it from the scope.",
"stride": "tampering",
"asset": "source",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"control": {
"name": "Read from the scope",
"text": "The realization and axis are read from the scope and a literal on the admission path fails the gate.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "EA-03 features/suites/admission.feature"
},
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "cargo xtask audit-parametric"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Unknown realization admitted",
"text": "A scope names a realization the registry does not know and the bytes are admitted unrealized.",
"stride": "tampering",
"asset": "answer",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"control": {
"name": "Not found, not admitted",
"text": "An unknown realization is indeterminate and never permitted.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "proof",
"reference": "EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs::inv002Holds"
}
]
}
}
],
"quality": [
{
"characteristic": "Security",
"subcharacteristic": "Resistance",
"requirement": "No unauthorized admission",
"text": "No request from an unauthorized principal is permitted.",
"measure": "Unauthorized permits",
"measureText": "Requests with an unauthorized principal that answer permit.",
"threshold": 0
},
{
"characteristic": "Functional suitability",
"subcharacteristic": "Functional completeness",
"requirement": "Every admission condition decided",
"text": "Each admission condition of SPEC.md 6.3 and the namespace conflict has its own answer.",
"measure": "Undecided conditions",
"measureText": "Admission failure conditions no rule decides.",
"threshold": 0
}
],
"journeys": [
{
"stakeholder": "Publisher",
"steps": [
"REQ-001",
"REQ-003",
"REQ-005",
"otherwise"
]
},
{
"stakeholder": "Supply-chain auditor",
"steps": [
"REQ-002",
"REQ-004",
"INV-001",
"INV-003"
]
}
],
"license": "MIT OR Apache-2.0",
"axioms": {}
}
model/ids.toml 65 lines
# model/ids.toml --- the conformance ID register.
#
# Every ID this repository claims, in one place, so that nothing is referenced
# without being defined. `CONFORMANCE.md` is generated from this file. A test
# whose name ends in an ID not listed here fails `check-model`, and an ID listed
# here with no scenario and no test fails it too (CM-02).
#
# `level` is the honesty level (R2):
# some-true a fact reproduced from an authority; not established here
# build constructed here and validated against its oracle
# open measured and reported, never asserted
#
# Every row here has a scenario in `features/suites/` and a test whose name ends
# in the ID, lowercased with underscores (R3, CM-02). There is no "pending"
# state: a capability that is not built does not get a row, and every row in this
# file is built.
#
# The first row is the template's own Prism application in `app/` (TC-01).
# A capability starts with a row here; `just new-capability` writes the row,
# its scenario and its failing test in the order `AGENTS.md` sets out.
spec = "template/1"
[[id]]
id = "EA-01"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "The app never answers permit when principal is unauthorized"
[[id]]
id = "EA-02"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "The app never answers permit when realization is unknown"
[[id]]
id = "EA-03"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "The app always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized"
[[id]]
id = "EA-04"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "The app always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped"
[[id]]
id = "EA-05"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references"
[[id]]
id = "EA-06"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared"
[[id]]
id = "EA-07"
level = "build"
suite = "emporous_admit_policy"
statement = "Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence"
features/suites/emporous_admit_policy.feature 44 lines
Feature: emporous_admit_policy
This repository's Prism application, in app/, generated by prism-code from its
spec: Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes.
@EA-01 @build
Scenario: The app never answers permit when principal is unauthorized
Given the model in app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv001Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv001
@EA-02 @build
Scenario: The app never answers permit when realization is unknown
Given the model in app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv002Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv002
@EA-03 @build
Scenario: The app always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized
Given the model in app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv003Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv003
@EA-04 @build
Scenario: The app always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped
Given the model in app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv004Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv004
@EA-05 @build
Scenario: The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references
Given the model in app/src/Architecture.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks architectureDescriptionHolds during prismpm verify
Then the architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references
@EA-06 @build
Scenario: The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared
Given the model in app/src/Quality.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks qualityModelHolds during prismpm verify
Then the ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared
@EA-07 @build
Scenario: Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
Given the model in app/src/Compliance.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks everyObligationEvidenced during prismpm verify
Then every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
crates/conformance/tests/emporous_admit_policy.rs 132 lines
//! The `emporous_admit_policy` suite: one test per scenario in `features/suites/emporous_admit_policy.feature`.
//!
//! Written by the Prism-DevRel builder from the app's prompt. The theorems are
//! checked by the Lean kernel when `just vv` runs `prismpm verify` on `app/`.
//! What these tests hold fixed is what each theorem is about, so a weakened
//! statement that still verifies fails the gate.
use std::path::PathBuf;
fn root() -> PathBuf {
PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
.ancestors()
.nth(2)
.expect("crates/conformance is two below the root")
.to_path_buf()
}
/// The body of the top-level declaration named `name`, up to its closing brace.
fn declaration<'a>(model: &'a str, name: &str) -> &'a str {
let start = model
.find(&format!("\n name: {name},\n"))
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{name} is not declared"));
let end = model[start..]
.find("\n}\n")
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{name} is not closed"));
&model[start..start + end]
}
fn module(path: &str) -> String {
std::fs::read_to_string(root().join(path)).expect("the module")
}
/// The condition no request may meet, and the theorem that says none does.
fn pinned(breaks: &str, condition: &str, theorem: &str) {
let model = module("app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex");
let found = declaration(&model, breaks);
assert!(
found.contains(condition),
"the condition of {breaks} changed:\n{found}"
);
let holds = declaration(&model, theorem);
let statement = format!("statement: (({breaks} request) = false),");
assert!(
holds.contains(&statement),
"{theorem} must state that no request meets {breaks}:\n{holds}"
);
}
/// A facet theorem: proved by `decide`, about exactly this predicate.
fn holds(path: &str, theorem: &str, statement: &str) {
let model = module(path);
let found = declaration(&model, theorem);
assert!(
found.contains(&format!("statement: {statement},")),
"{theorem} must state {statement}:\n{found}"
);
assert!(
found.contains("proof: decide{}"),
"{theorem} is proved by decide"
);
}
/// `EA-01`: The app never answers permit when principal is unauthorized
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_01() {
pinned(
"breaksInv001",
"body: (((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized))) && ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit)))",
"inv001Holds",
);
}
/// `EA-02`: The app never answers permit when realization is unknown
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_02() {
pinned(
"breaksInv002",
"body: (((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request realization) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationUnknown))) && ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerPermit)))",
"inv002Holds",
);
}
/// `EA-03`: The app always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_03() {
pinned(
"breaksInv003",
"body: (((((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request namespace2) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Scoped))) && ((project request realization) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::realizationKnown))) && ((project request principal) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::principalUnauthorized))) && (not ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerDeny))))",
"inv003Holds",
);
}
/// `EA-04`: The app always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_04() {
pinned(
"breaksInv004",
"body: (((((((project request namespace2) <? 3) && ((project request realization) <? 2)) && ((project request principal) <? 2)) && ((project request bytes) <? 2)) && ((project request namespace2) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::namespace2Unscoped))) && (not ((EmporousAdmitPolicy::judge request) =? (EmporousAdmitPolicy::answerNotApplicable))))",
"inv004Holds",
);
}
/// `EA-05`: The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_05() {
holds(
"app/src/Architecture.lex.tex",
"architectureDescriptionHolds",
"((architectureValid) = true)",
);
}
/// `EA-06`: The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_06() {
holds(
"app/src/Quality.lex.tex",
"qualityModelHolds",
"((qualityValid) = true)",
);
}
/// `EA-07`: Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
#[test]
fn emporous_admit_policy_ea_07() {
holds(
"app/src/Compliance.lex.tex",
"everyObligationEvidenced",
"((obligationsEvidenced 0 (obligations)) = true)",
);
}
site/app.json 114 lines
{
"name": "Emporous admission",
"shortName": "Emporous",
"live": "https://afflom.github.io/emporous/",
"purpose": "Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes. Send namespace, realization, principal or bytes, separated by spaces; it answers permit, deny, not-applicable or indeterminate, and invalid request for anything else.",
"inputLabel": "Request: namespace realization principal bytes",
"placeholder": "scoped known authorized realizable",
"submitLabel": "Decide",
"outputLabel": "Answer",
"answers": {
"positive": [
"permit"
],
"negative": [
"deny",
"not-applicable",
"indeterminate"
],
"refusal": "invalid request"
},
"promise": {
"headline": "Says conformant exactly when every policy file matches its lock.",
"detail": "Each of the six universal policy files is compared with the digest the lock records, and any file that drifted is named."
},
"claim": "EA-01: the app never answers permit when principal is unauthorized. EA-02: the app never answers permit when realization is unknown. EA-03: the app always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized. EA-04: the app always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped.",
"proposition": {
"name": "judge",
"text": "judge request :=\n namespace is unscoped → not-applicable\n namespace is conflicted → indeterminate\n realization is unknown → indeterminate\n principal is unauthorized → deny\n bytes is refused → deny\n otherwise → permit",
"plain": "Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes."
},
"theorems": [
{
"name": "inv001Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv001: the app never answers permit when principal is unauthorized",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex"
},
{
"name": "inv002Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv002: the app never answers permit when realization is unknown",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex"
},
{
"name": "inv003Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv003: the app always answers deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex"
},
{
"name": "inv004Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv004: the app always answers not-applicable when namespace is unscoped",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/EmporousAdmitPolicyProofs.lex.tex"
}
],
"pinned": [
{
"name": "emporous_admit_policy_ea_01",
"what": "EA-01's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/emporous_admit_policy.rs"
},
{
"name": "emporous_admit_policy_ea_02",
"what": "EA-02's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/emporous_admit_policy.rs"
},
{
"name": "emporous_admit_policy_ea_03",
"what": "EA-03's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/emporous_admit_policy.rs"
},
{
"name": "emporous_admit_policy_ea_04",
"what": "EA-04's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/emporous_admit_policy.rs"
}
],
"trusted": [
{
"name": "SDK image",
"value": "the digest prismpm.lock pins; see the bootstrap workflow's log"
},
{
"name": "Lean toolchain",
"value": "leanprover/lean4:v4.32.1"
},
{
"name": "LexLean compiler semantics",
"value": "5262e5b4c8b5668ae7066ad686757a6bb7f80c941d515fb9d586894fbc7de69a"
},
{
"name": "prism-code runtime, vendored",
"value": "0.2.0, see try/vendor/prism-code/VENDOR.md"
},
{
"name": "Your browser",
"value": "runs the WebAssembly guest and this page"
}
],
"attestations": {
"proof": {
"id": "not recorded: the proof ran in the SDK image, not on the UOR MCP server",
"url": "https://github.com/afflom/emporous/actions/workflows/bootstrap.yml"
},
"build": {
"id": "printed by prismpm verify in every pages run",
"url": "https://github.com/afflom/emporous/actions/workflows/pages.yml"
}
},
"repository": "https://github.com/afflom/emporous",
"report": "https://github.com/afflom/emporous/blob/main/TEMPLATE-VERIFICATION.md"
}
openspec/specs/emporous-admit-policy/spec.md 184 lines
# emporous-admit-policy Specification
<!-- Generated by Prism from prism/spec.json. Change the app through your agent with /prism, not by editing this file. -->
## Purpose
Emporous admission: Decide whether one representation is admitted under the scope its namespace names, from the scope, its realization, the principal and the bytes.
## Requirements
### Requirement: Never permit when principal is unauthorized
The app SHALL NOT answer `permit` when principal is unauthorized, because EA-05: admission into a namespace requires the capability its scope names.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-001, theorem `inv001Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-001 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped known unauthorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL NOT be `permit`
- **AND** the app answers `deny`, decided by REQ-004
### Requirement: Never permit when realization is unknown
The app SHALL NOT answer `permit` when realization is unknown, because EA-03: a scope naming a realization the registry does not know is reported as not found.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-002, theorem `inv002Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-002 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped unknown authorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL NOT be `permit`
- **AND** the app answers `indeterminate`, decided by REQ-003
### Requirement: Always deny when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized
The app SHALL answer `deny` when namespace is scoped and realization is known and principal is unauthorized, because admit.rs checks authorization before the realization reads the bytes.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-003, theorem `inv003Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-003 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped known unauthorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `deny`
- **AND** the app answers `deny`, decided by REQ-004
### Requirement: Always not-applicable when namespace is unscoped
The app SHALL answer `not-applicable` when namespace is unscoped, because without a scope there is no realization, axis or authorization to apply.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-004, theorem `inv004Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-004 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `unscoped known authorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `not-applicable`
- **AND** the app answers `not-applicable`, decided by REQ-001
### Requirement: REQ-001 not-applicable when namespace is unscoped
The app SHALL answer `not-applicable` when namespace is unscoped, because crates/admission/src/scope.rs scope_of_namespace: the namespace names no scope, StoreError::NotFound.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule1`).
#### Scenario: REQ-001 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `unscoped known authorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `not-applicable`, decided by REQ-001
### Requirement: REQ-002 indeterminate when namespace is conflicted
The app SHALL answer `indeterminate` when namespace is conflicted and no earlier rule matches, because crates/admission/src/scope.rs: a namespace naming more than one scope is StoreError::Conflict.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule2`).
#### Scenario: REQ-002 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `conflicted known authorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `indeterminate`, decided by REQ-002
### Requirement: REQ-003 indeterminate when realization is unknown
The app SHALL answer `indeterminate` when realization is unknown and no earlier rule matches, because crates/admission/src/admit.rs: the registry does not know the realization, StoreError::NotFound (EA-03).
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule3`).
#### Scenario: REQ-003 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped unknown authorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `indeterminate`, decided by REQ-003
### Requirement: REQ-004 deny when principal is unauthorized
The app SHALL answer `deny` when principal is unauthorized and no earlier rule matches, because crates/admission/src/admit.rs and auth.rs: the principal is not authorized by the scope capability, StoreError::Rejected (EA-05).
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule4`).
#### Scenario: REQ-004 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped known unauthorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `deny`, decided by REQ-004
### Requirement: REQ-005 deny when bytes is refused
The app SHALL answer `deny` when bytes is refused and no earlier rule matches, because crates/admission/src/realize.rs: the realization refuses the bytes, StoreError::Rejected.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule5`).
#### Scenario: REQ-005 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped known authorized refused` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `deny`, decided by REQ-005
### Requirement: Otherwise permit
The app SHALL answer `permit` when no rule matches, because SPEC.md 5.1: the canonical form is ingested on the scope axis and the received bytes at their own kappa, joined by a DerivedFrom edge.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors.
#### Scenario: No rule matches
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped known authorized realizable` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`
### Requirement: The first matching rule decides
The app SHALL try REQ-001, REQ-002, REQ-003, REQ-004, REQ-005 in that order, and the first rule that matches SHALL decide.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors.
#### Scenario: Two rules match
- **WHEN** the request is `scoped known unauthorized refused` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `deny`, decided by REQ-004, the earlier rule
### Requirement: Request and answers
The app SHALL read one request as one line of 4 fields separated by single spaces, in this order, and SHALL answer exactly one of `permit`, `deny`, `not-applicable`, `indeterminate`, or `invalid` for anything else.
| Field | Accepts | Means |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `namespace` | `scoped`, `unscoped`, `conflicted` | whether the namespace names exactly one scope, none, or more than one |
| `realization` | `known`, `unknown` | whether the registry knows the realization the scope names |
| `principal` | `authorized`, `unauthorized` | whether a capability-edge walk reaches the principal from the scope authorization |
| `bytes` | `realizable`, `refused` | whether the realization carries the bytes to a canonical form |
| Answer | Means |
| --- | --- |
| `permit` | XACML 3.0 section 7: Permit; the object kappa, the representation kappa and a DerivedFrom edge are written |
| `deny` | XACML 3.0 section 7: Deny; StoreError::Rejected and no DerivedFrom edge is written |
| `not-applicable` | XACML 3.0 section 7: NotApplicable; the namespace names no scope, so no policy governs it |
| `indeterminate` | XACML 3.0 section 7: Indeterminate; the scope cannot be evaluated, because its realization is unknown or the namespace names several scopes |
| `invalid` | the request is malformed |
Verified: reading a request is tested, not proved.
#### Scenario: A malformed request is invalid
- **WHEN** the request is not 4 fields in this order
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `invalid`
## Examples
- `scoped known authorized realizable` gives `permit`
- `scoped known unauthorized realizable` gives `deny`
- `scoped unknown authorized realizable` gives `indeterminate`
- `unscoped known authorized realizable` gives `not-applicable`
- `scoped known authorized refused` gives `deny`
- `conflicted known authorized realizable` gives `indeterminate`
- `scoped known unauthorized refused` gives `deny`
## What is proved and what is tested
Lean proves each property marked proved above, for every request that decodes, with no exceptions and no sampling. The proof is about `judge`, the function the WebAssembly guest runs, because both come from the same model.
The parsing of requests is tested, not proved: the acceptance vectors in the app replay through the built guest, including malformed and oversized requests.
Nothing here says the rules are the right rules. That is the part only you can judge.
## Files
- `prism/spec.json` is this spec as data.
- `src/EmporousAdmitPolicy.lex.tex` is the LexLean model generated from it. It is the single source of the app.
Words on this page 7
- record
- One entry in a facet: a component, a threat, a measure or a journey step, with the place in the source it came from.
- Lean kernel
- The small checker at the heart of the Lean prover. It accepts a proof only if every step follows the rules.
- theorem
- A statement about the model that the Lean kernel has checked, so it holds for every input, not only the ones tested.
- SDK
- Software development kit. Here, the PrismPM container image that builds, checks and verifies Prism models.
- κ
- A content address: a hash of the exact bytes a record was read from, so anyone can check where it came from.
- stakeholder
- A person or group with an interest in the system, as ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 defines it.
- XACML
- OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 3.0: a policy decides permit, deny, not applicable or indeterminate.