Examples: Namespace authorization
Overview
Example appsDecision tables
Rule 30 cellStrike dieWise deferralCurrent supportHeader workPlant attunementCapability routePublish gateProposal admissionCompression admissionQuorum commitAddress admissionDataflow policyDraft admissionCoded matmul admissionUTQC row honestyCalculator protocolRequantization clampJCS NFC admissionTwo-seed barDocs sync// example · Policy decisions
Namespace authorization
Decide if kappa-registry lets someone change a namespace. Only its owner, a key holder or a short chain of trust can write.
Inspired by UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry. A single-binary content-addressed registry serving OCI, Git, S3, Nix and AT Protocol from one store, with capability-edge authorization and bounded delegation.
Pattern: Policy decision, OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point. To write one of your own, follow How to build a policy decision app.
The data in this figure
| Step | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1. Request | op, store, target, grant, hops |
| 2. 10 rules | the first that applies decides |
| 3. Answer | permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate |
| 4. Proved | 4 theorems, 52 tests |
- Fingerprint
d6d139bca1242def3754b3acbecba672edd2c861ff03dad6f433edb411da2e06- Acceptance vectors
- 52
- Claims
- 7
Verified by prismpm verify in the pinned SDK when this site was built.
The prompt
This is the whole input. Raw JSON · Open it in the builder · Download the app (.zip)
The prompt 471 lines
{
"schema": "prism/prompt/1",
"goal": "Decide if kappa-registry lets someone change a namespace. Only its owner, a key holder or a short chain of trust can write.",
"pattern": "policyDecision",
"repository": "UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry",
"app": {
"name": "namespace-authorization",
"limits": [
"It does not resolve namespaces or walk edges; it decides from the authority the walk found.",
"The redb store and the identity system are outside it."
],
"title": "Namespace authorization",
"purpose": "Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes.",
"fields": [
{
"name": "op",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"exempt",
"read",
"write",
"admin"
],
"means": "the operation class"
},
{
"name": "store",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"ok",
"error"
],
"means": "whether the store answered the delegation walk"
},
{
"name": "target",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"existing",
"unclaimed",
"absent",
"reserved",
"none"
],
"means": "the namespace: claimed, existing with no capability edges, absent, absent and reserved, or none"
},
{
"name": "grant",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"none",
"root",
"owner",
"direct",
"parent",
"role",
"delegated"
],
"means": "the first authority the asserter holds, in authorize's order"
},
{
"name": "hops",
"kind": "number",
"min": 0,
"means": "delegation hops walked to a capability holder",
"max": 10
}
],
"outcomes": [
"permit",
"deny",
"not-applicable",
"indeterminate"
],
"meanings": {
"permit": "Allowed, AllowCreateNew or AllowedViaDelegation",
"deny": "Forbidden: access denied, or a reserved namespace needs _root authority",
"not-applicable": "NotFound: a read of a namespace that does not exist",
"indeterminate": "a store error during the auth check, so no decision is made"
},
"rules": [
{
"when": [
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs authorize: an Exempt operation is Allowed before any check"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "store",
"op": "is",
"value": "error"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "auth.rs: a store error in the delegation walk is AuthError::Store, not a decision"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "root"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs step 1: a capability on _root allows any namespace"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "none"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs: ResolvedNamespace::NoNamespace is Allowed"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "reserved"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "auth.rs: an absent reserved namespace requires _root authority"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "absent"
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is",
"value": "read"
}
],
"then": "not-applicable",
"why": "auth.rs: reading an absent namespace is AuthError::NotFound"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "absent"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs: a write to an absent non-reserved namespace is AllowCreateNew, first writer claims"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "unclaimed"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs step 3: a non-reserved namespace with no capability edges is open"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is not",
"value": "none"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is not",
"value": "delegated"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs steps 2, 4, 5 and 6: owner, direct capability, parent namespace or held role"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "delegated"
},
{
"field": "hops",
"op": "<=",
"value": 5
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs check_delegation_inner: a delegation chain counts up to hop 5, AllowedViaDelegation"
}
],
"otherwise": "deny",
"otherwiseWhy": "auth.rs: no authority found, Forbidden access denied",
"properties": [
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is",
"value": "read"
},
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "existing"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "none"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "a claimed namespace is never read without authority"
},
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "existing"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "delegated"
},
{
"field": "hops",
"op": ">",
"value": 5
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is not",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "the delegation walk is bounded at five hops"
},
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "reserved"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is not",
"value": "root"
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is not",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "a reserved namespace needs _root authority"
},
{
"kind": "always",
"when": [
{
"field": "store",
"op": "is",
"value": "error"
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is not",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "a store error never becomes a permit or a deny"
}
],
"examples": [
{
"request": "read ok existing owner 0",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "read ok existing none 0",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "write ok absent none 0",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "read ok absent none 0",
"response": "not-applicable"
},
{
"request": "admin ok reserved none 0",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "write ok existing delegated 5",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "write ok existing delegated 6",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "read error existing owner 0",
"response": "indeterminate"
},
{
"request": "exempt error none none 0",
"response": "permit"
}
]
},
"stakeholders": [
{
"name": "Namespace owner",
"text": "Owns a namespace and needs nothing but an owner, a capability holder or a bounded delegation to write to it.",
"concerns": [
"Proved guarantees",
"Correct answers"
]
},
{
"name": "Registry operator",
"text": "Runs the single-binary server for Docker, Git, S3, Nix and AT Protocol clients and needs reserved namespaces kept for _root.",
"concerns": [
"Reserved namespaces protected"
]
}
],
"concerns": [
{
"name": "Reserved namespaces protected",
"text": "The reserved namespaces, such as kappa/protocols, kappa/runtimes and kappa/os, are created only with _root authority.",
"model": "security"
}
],
"components": [
{
"name": "Protocol clients",
"text": "docker push, git push, aws s3, nix copy and XRPC clients, each speaking its native protocol to the one server.",
"kind": "externalSystem"
},
{
"name": "redb store",
"text": "state.redb: tags, edges, sequences, namespaces and epochs, which the auth checks query.",
"kind": "database"
}
],
"threats": [
{
"name": "Delegation asserted by a third party",
"text": "Someone other than the source writes a delegation edge on its behalf to grant themselves access.",
"stride": "spoofing",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "medium",
"impact": "critical",
"control": {
"name": "Source must assert",
"text": "A delegation counts only if its asserter is its source.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "review",
"reference": "crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs check_delegation_inner"
},
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "crates/kappa-server/tests/integration/delegation.rs"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Unbounded delegation walk",
"text": "A long or cyclic delegation chain makes authorization walk without end or grants access far down a chain.",
"stride": "denialOfService",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"control": {
"name": "Five hops",
"text": "The walk stops after hop 5, and beyond it nothing is permitted, proved for every request.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "proof",
"reference": "KappaDominanceProofs::inv002Holds"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Fail-open on an edge query error",
"text": "Step 3's edge query for an unclaimed namespace answers Allowed when the store errors.",
"stride": "elevationOfPrivilege",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"accepted": "The app models a store error as indeterminate; auth.rs step 3 allows on an edge-query error, a fail-open recorded here for the repository to review."
}
],
"quality": [
{
"characteristic": "Security",
"subcharacteristic": "Resistance",
"requirement": "No authority, no write",
"text": "No read, write or admin of a claimed namespace is permitted without an owner, capability, role or delegation within five hops.",
"measure": "Unauthorized permits",
"measureText": "Requests with no grant on a claimed namespace answered permit.",
"threshold": 0
}
],
"journeys": [
{
"stakeholder": "Namespace owner",
"steps": [
"REQ-009",
"REQ-010",
"otherwise",
"INV-001",
"INV-002"
]
},
{
"stakeholder": "Registry operator",
"steps": [
"REQ-003",
"REQ-005",
"REQ-007",
"INV-003"
]
}
],
"axioms": {
"inv003Holds": [
"Classical.choice",
"Quot.sound",
"propext"
],
"inv004Holds": [
"Classical.choice",
"Quot.sound",
"propext"
]
},
"license": "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
}What the app claims
Each claim is a row in model/ids.toml, a scenario and a test, and a theorem the Lean kernel checks. The claims are quoted as the model states them.
NA-01The app never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is noneNA-02The app never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exemptNA-03The app never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exemptNA-04The app always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exemptNA-05The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it referencesNA-06The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declaredNA-07Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
Pattern
Policy decision: OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point. The answer is one XACML 3.0 decision: permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate. A policy that applies gives permit or deny. If none applies, the answer is not-applicable. If the request cannot be judged, it is indeterminate.
| Pattern | Standard | Answers |
|---|---|---|
| Policy decision | OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point | permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate |
Behavior
A request is op, store, target, grant, hops, separated by spaces. The first rule that matches decides. If none matches, the answer is deny. A request over 136 bytes, or in any other form, is answered invalid.
Behavior 11 rows
| Rule | When | Answer | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-001 | op is exempt | permit | crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs authorize: an Exempt operation is Allowed before any check |
| REQ-002 | store is error | indeterminate | auth.rs: a store error in the delegation walk is AuthError::Store, not a decision |
| REQ-003 | grant is root | permit | auth.rs step 1: a capability on _root allows any namespace |
| REQ-004 | target is none | permit | auth.rs: ResolvedNamespace::NoNamespace is Allowed |
| REQ-005 | target is reserved | deny | auth.rs: an absent reserved namespace requires _root authority |
| REQ-006 | target is absent and op is read | not-applicable | auth.rs: reading an absent namespace is AuthError::NotFound |
| REQ-007 | target is absent | permit | auth.rs: a write to an absent non-reserved namespace is AllowCreateNew, first writer claims |
| REQ-008 | target is unclaimed | permit | auth.rs step 3: a non-reserved namespace with no capability edges is open |
| REQ-009 | grant is not none and grant is not delegated | permit | auth.rs steps 2, 4, 5 and 6: owner, direct capability, parent namespace or held role |
| REQ-010 | grant is delegated and hops is at most 5 | permit | auth.rs check_delegation_inner: a delegation chain counts up to hop 5, AllowedViaDelegation |
| otherwise | no rule matches | deny | auth.rs: no authority found, Forbidden access denied |
Properties Lean proves
Each property is a theorem about the same definitions the app is built from. It is proved for every request, not only the tested ones.
Properties Lean proves 4 rows
| Property | Statement | Theorem | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| INV-001 | It never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none. | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv001Holds | a claimed namespace is never read without authority |
| INV-002 | It never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt. | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv002Holds | the delegation walk is bounded at five hops |
| INV-003 | It never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt. | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv003Holds | a reserved namespace needs _root authority |
| INV-004 | It always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt. | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv004Holds | a store error never becomes a permit or a deny |
Architecture
Stakeholders and the concerns each one views the app through (ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010).
| Stakeholder | Who they are | Concerns |
|---|---|---|
| Namespace owner | Owns a namespace and needs nothing but an owner, a capability holder or a bounded delegation to write to it. | Proved guarantees, Correct answers |
| Registry operator | Runs the single-binary server for Docker, Git, S3, Nix and AT Protocol clients and needs reserved namespaces kept for _root. | Reserved namespaces protected |
| Verifier | Anyone who loads the holo, checks its fingerprint and replays its acceptance vectors before trusting an answer. | Integrity of the published app, Refused malformed requests, Proved guarantees |
Concerns
What the stakeholders care about, and the model each is viewed in.
| Concern | What it means | Model |
|---|---|---|
| Correct answers | Every well-formed request is answered by the first rule that matches it, or deny when none does, as the spec states. | quality |
| Integrity of the published app | What a visitor runs is the holo the build verified, with its fingerprint and signed provenance beside it. | security |
| Proved guarantees | Each of the 4 properties of the spec holds for every request, proved by the Lean kernel. | quality |
| Refused malformed requests | A request that is not the 5 fields in order, or is longer than 136 bytes, is answered invalid and never guessed. | security |
| Reserved namespaces protected | The reserved namespaces, such as kappa/protocols, kappa/runtimes and kappa/os, are created only with _root authority. | security |
Components
8 components and 11 edges between them.
| Component | Kind | What it is |
|---|---|---|
| Browser | externalSystem | The visitor's web browser, which loads the page and runs the Namespace authorization guest. |
| GitHub Pages | externalSystem | Serves the page and the holo from the repository Pages workflow. |
| Namespace authorization guest | service | The Core-Wasm guest built from the model: it answers one request of at most 136 bytes with one answer of at most 64. |
| Namespace authorization page | staticSite | The page the template publishes: the holo, its fingerprint, its provenance and its acceptance vectors. |
| Prism build | cliAdapter | prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins: it checks every theorem, builds the guest and replays every vector. |
| Protocol clients | externalSystem | docker push, git push, aws s3, nix copy and XRPC clients, each speaking its native protocol to the one server. |
| redb store | database | state.redb: tags, edges, sequences, namespaces and epochs, which the auth checks query. |
| Source repository | externalSystem | The repository that holds the prompt, the model and its gate. |
Design views
The SDK checks each view against the system model and draws it as OPL and PlantUML.
| View | Diagram | Viewpoint |
|---|---|---|
| Deciding a Namespace authorization request | opmObjectProcess | Namespace owner: Correct answers |
| Components of Namespace authorization | umlComponent | Verifier: Integrity of the published app |
| Answering a Namespace authorization request | umlSequence | Namespace owner: Correct answers |
| States of the Namespace authorization guest | umlStateMachine | Verifier: Refused malformed requests |
Features and journeys
16 features. Each names the definitions that do the work and the tests that accept it. Each stakeholder has one journey.
Features and journeys 16 rows
| Feature | Calls | Accepted by |
|---|---|---|
| When op is exempt, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule1, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When store is error, the answer is indeterminate. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule2, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When grant is root, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule3, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When target is none, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule4, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When target is reserved, the answer is deny. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule5, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When target is absent and op is read, the answer is not-applicable. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule6, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When target is absent, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule7, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When target is unclaimed, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule8, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When grant is not none and grant is not delegated, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule9, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When grant is delegated and hops is at most 5, the answer is permit. | NamespaceAuthorization::rule10, NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| When no rule matches, the answer is deny. | NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| A request that is not op, store, target, grant, hops in order, separated by single spaces, or is over 136 bytes, is answered invalid. | NamespaceAuthorization::dispatch, NamespaceAuthorization::decodeField1 | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| It never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none. | NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv001Holds |
| It never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt. | NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv002Holds |
| It never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt. | NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv003Holds |
| It always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt. | NamespaceAuthorization::judge | NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv004Holds |
Journeys
The ordered features each stakeholder takes.
| Stakeholder | Steps |
|---|---|
| Namespace owner | REQ-009 → REQ-010 → otherwise → INV-001 → INV-002 |
| Registry operator | REQ-003 → REQ-005 → REQ-007 → INV-003 |
| Verifier | refuse → INV-001 → INV-002 → INV-003 → INV-004 |
Security and threat model
13 threats against 4 assets. Each has a STRIDE category, and either a control with evidence or a risk that is accepted on purpose.
Security and threat model 13 rows
| Threat | STRIDE | Asset | Risk | Answered by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Answer that breaks INV-001 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-001: proof NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv001Holds |
| Answer that breaks INV-002 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-002: proof NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv002Holds |
| Answer that breaks INV-003 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-003: proof NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv003Holds |
| Answer that breaks INV-004 | repudiation | Answer | medium likelihood, critical impact | Proof of INV-004: proof NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv004Holds |
| Delegation asserted by a third party | spoofing | Request bytes | medium likelihood, critical impact | Source must assert: review crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs check_delegation_inner; gate crates/kappa-server/tests/integration/delegation.rs |
| Fail-open on an edge query error | elevationOfPrivilege | Request bytes | low likelihood, major impact | accepted: The app models a store error as indeterminate; auth.rs step 3 allows on an edge-query error, a fail-open recorded here for the repository to review. |
| Granted capability | informationDisclosure | Answer | low likelihood, major impact | No capability granted: gate prism-code check refuses an ungranted guest import |
| Malformed request | tampering | Request bytes | high likelihood, major impact | Strict decoder: gate malformed-request acceptance vectors, replayed in the compiled guest by prismpm verify |
| Oversized request | denialOfService | Request bytes | medium likelihood, minor impact | Bounded request: gate acceptance vectors at the request bound, one byte over it, and at the guest allocation bound, replayed by prismpm verify |
| Substituted holo | spoofing | Published holo | low likelihood, critical impact | Fingerprint and provenance: gate actions/attest-build-provenance in the pages workflow; gate prism-code check of the holo identities in the page |
| Substituted host | spoofing | Published holo | low likelihood, critical impact | accepted: A page cannot defend against its own host. The holo carries signed build provenance a visitor can check, and the app can be rebuilt from its prompt. |
| Tampered model | tampering | Model source | low likelihood, major impact | Regenerated from the prompt: gate prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins; review app/prompt.json |
| Unbounded delegation walk | denialOfService | Request bytes | low likelihood, major impact | Five hops: proof KappaDominanceProofs::inv002Holds |
Quality
ISO/IEC 25010:2023 requirements. Each has a measure and a threshold that a theorem pins.
Quality 7 rows
| Requirement | Characteristic | Measure | Threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bounded allocation: The guest allocates at most 272 bytes for one request. | Performance efficiency: Resource utilization | Guest allocation bytes | 272 |
| Bounded request: A request over 136 bytes is refused before any field is read. | Performance efficiency: Time behaviour | Request bytes read | 136 |
| Every property proved: All 4 properties are theorems the Lean kernel checks. | Security: Integrity | Unproved properties | 0 |
| Every request answered: Every request gets an answer: a rule, deny otherwise, or invalid. | Functional suitability: Functional completeness | Unanswered requests | 0 |
| Every vector replays: All 52 acceptance vectors replay in the compiled guest, the shortest 0 bytes long. | Reliability: Faultlessness | Failed vectors | 0 |
| Examples answered as stated: Every one of the 9 examples of the spec is answered as it states. | Functional suitability: Functional correctness | Example mismatches | 0 |
| No authority, no write: No read, write or admin of a claimed namespace is permitted without an owner, capability, role or delegation within five hops. | Security: Resistance | Unauthorized permits | 0 |
Compliance
One obligation per standard, each naming its evidence.
| Standard | Subject | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2022 | Architecture description | Architecture::architectureDescriptionHolds |
| ISO/PAS 19450:2015 and OMG UML 2.5.1 | Design views | Design::viewOpmDecide, Design::viewUmlComponents, Design::viewUmlRequest, Design::viewUmlStates |
| ISO/IEC 25010:2023 | Product quality | Quality::qualityModelHolds |
| ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011 and ISO/IEC 27005:2022 | Application security and risk | Security::controlSet |
| OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point | Policy decision | NamespaceAuthorization::judge, NamespaceAuthorization::encodeAnswer |
| OpenSpec | Requirements | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
| SPDX MIT OR Apache-2.0 | Licensing | NamespaceAuthorization::application |
Rendered design views
Written by the SDK from the design records when it verified the app.
design/Design.viewOpmDecide.opl
View: Design::viewOpmDecide
Title: Deciding a Namespace authorization request
Viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers
Notation: ISO/PAS 19450:2015 OPM, Prism OPL profile
componentBrowser is an object.
componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest is an object.
componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest can be stateDeciding or stateIdle.
processDecide is a process.
processEncodeAnswer is a process.
processJudge is a process.
processParseRequest is a process.
componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest handles processDecide.
processParseRequest requires componentBrowser.
processEncodeAnswer affects componentBrowser.
processJudge invokes processEncodeAnswer.
processParseRequest invokes processJudge.
processDecide zooms into processParseRequest, processJudge, and processEncodeAnswer, in that sequence.
design/Design.viewUmlComponents.puml
@startuml
' UML 2.5.1 component diagram
' view: Design::viewUmlComponents
' viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp
title Components of Namespace authorization
component "componentBrowser" as c0
component "componentGitHubPages" as c1
component "componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest" as c2
component "componentNamespaceAuthorizationPage" as c3
component "componentPrismBuild" as c4
component "componentProtocolClients" as c5
component "componentRedbStore" as c6
component "componentSourceRepository" as c7
c0 --> c2 : edgeBrowserToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest
c1 --> c0 : edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser
c2 --> c0 : edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToBrowser
c2 --> c5 : edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToProtocolClients
c2 --> c6 : edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToRedbStore
c3 --> c1 : edgeNamespaceAuthorizationPageToGitHubPages
c4 --> c2 : edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest
c4 --> c3 : edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationPage
c5 --> c2 : edgeProtocolClientsToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest
c6 --> c2 : edgeRedbStoreToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest
c7 --> c4 : edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild
@enduml
design/Design.viewUmlRequest.puml
@startuml
' UML 2.5.1 sequence diagram
' view: Design::viewUmlRequest
' viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers
title Answering a Namespace authorization request
participant "componentBrowser" as p0
participant "componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest" as p1
p0 -> p1 : processDecide
p1 --> p0 : processDecide
@enduml
design/Design.viewUmlStates.puml
@startuml
' UML 2.5.1 state machine diagram
' view: Design::viewUmlStates
' viewpoint: Architecture::viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests
title States of the Namespace authorization guest
state "stateAnsweredDeny" as s0
state "stateAnsweredIndeterminate" as s1
state "stateAnsweredNotApplicable" as s2
state "stateAnsweredPermit" as s3
state "stateDeciding" as s4
state "stateIdle" as s5
state "stateRefused" as s6
[*] --> s5
s5 --> s4 : processParseRequest
s5 --> s6 : processParseRequest
s4 --> s3 : processRule1
s4 --> s1 : processRule2
s4 --> s3 : processRule3
s4 --> s3 : processRule4
s4 --> s0 : processRule5
s4 --> s2 : processRule6
s4 --> s3 : processRule7
s4 --> s3 : processRule8
s4 --> s3 : processRule9
s4 --> s3 : processRule10
s4 --> s0 : processOtherwise
s3 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s0 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s2 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s1 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
s6 --> s5 : processEncodeAnswer
@enduml
Prism source
Every file the builder wrote, laid out as a repository created from UOR-Foundation/template. The language packages and Foundation modules every app shares are in the download.
app/src/Architecture.lex.tex 399 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Architecture}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Arch}
\title{architectural component}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: standardIso25010,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 0, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-25010-2023", edition := "2023"})
}
definition{
name: standardIso27005,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 1, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-27005-2022", edition := "2022"})
}
definition{
name: standardIso27034,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 2, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-27034-1-2011", edition := "2011"})
}
definition{
name: standardIso42010,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::StandardReference,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::StandardReference {standardIndex := 4, editionIndex := 0, standardId := "ISO-42010-2022", edition := "2022"})
}
definition{
name: stakeholderNamespaceOwner,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder {index := 0, name := "Namespace owner", text := "Owns a namespace and needs nothing but an owner, a capability holder or a bounded delegation to write to it."})
}
definition{
name: stakeholderRegistryOperator,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder {index := 1, name := "Registry operator", text := "Runs the single-binary server for Docker, Git, S3, Nix and AT Protocol clients and needs reserved namespaces kept for _root."})
}
definition{
name: stakeholderVerifier,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Stakeholder {index := 2, name := "Verifier", text := "Anyone who loads the holo, checks its fingerprint and replays its acceptance vectors before trusting an answer."})
}
definition{
name: concernCorrectAnswers,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 0, name := "Correct answers", text := "Every well-formed request is answered by the first rule that matches it, or deny when none does, as the spec states."})
}
definition{
name: concernIntegrityOfThePublishedApp,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 1, name := "Integrity of the published app", text := "What a visitor runs is the holo the build verified, with its fingerprint and signed provenance beside it."})
}
definition{
name: concernProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 2, name := "Proved guarantees", text := "Each of the 4 properties of the spec holds for every request, proved by the Lean kernel."})
}
definition{
name: concernRefusedMalformedRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 3, name := "Refused malformed requests", text := "A request that is not the 5 fields in order, or is longer than 136 bytes, is answered invalid and never guessed."})
}
definition{
name: concernReservedNamespacesProtected,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Concern,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Concern {index := 4, name := "Reserved namespaces protected", text := "The reserved namespaces, such as kappa/protocols, kappa/runtimes and kappa/os, are created only with _root authority."})
}
definition{
name: componentBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 0, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "Browser", text := "The visitor's web browser, which loads the page and runs the Namespace authorization guest."})
}
definition{
name: componentGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "GitHub Pages", text := "Serves the page and the holo from the repository Pages workflow."})
}
definition{
name: componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.service), name := "Namespace authorization guest", text := "The Core-Wasm guest built from the model: it answers one request of at most 136 bytes with one answer of at most 64."})
}
definition{
name: componentNamespaceAuthorizationPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 3, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.staticSite), name := "Namespace authorization page", text := "The page the template publishes: the holo, its fingerprint, its provenance and its acceptance vectors."})
}
definition{
name: componentPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 4, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.cliAdapter), name := "Prism build", text := "prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins: it checks every theorem, builds the guest and replays every vector."})
}
definition{
name: componentProtocolClients,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 5, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "Protocol clients", text := "docker push, git push, aws s3, nix copy and XRPC clients, each speaking its native protocol to the one server."})
}
definition{
name: componentRedbStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 6, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.database), name := "redb store", text := "state.redb: tags, edges, sequences, namespaces and epochs, which the auth checks query."})
}
definition{
name: componentSourceRepository,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Component,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Component {index := 7, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::ComponentKind.externalSystem), name := "Source repository", text := "The repository that holds the prompt, the model and its gate."})
}
definition{
name: edgeBrowserToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 0, fromIndex := 0, toIndex := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 1, fromIndex := 1, toIndex := 0, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 2, fromIndex := 2, toIndex := 0, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToProtocolClients,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 3, fromIndex := 2, toIndex := 5, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToRedbStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 4, fromIndex := 2, toIndex := 6, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeNamespaceAuthorizationPageToGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 5, fromIndex := 3, toIndex := 1, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 6, fromIndex := 4, toIndex := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 7, fromIndex := 4, toIndex := 3, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeProtocolClientsToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 8, fromIndex := 5, toIndex := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeRedbStoreToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 9, fromIndex := 6, toIndex := 2, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Edge,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Edge {index := 10, fromIndex := 7, toIndex := 4, kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::EdgeKind.dataFlow)})
}
definition{
name: viewpointNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 0, stakeholderIndex := 0, concernIndex := 0, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewpointNamespaceOwnerProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 1, stakeholderIndex := 0, concernIndex := 2, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewpointRegistryOperatorReservedNamespacesProtected,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 2, stakeholderIndex := 1, concernIndex := 4, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 3, stakeholderIndex := 2, concernIndex := 1, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewpointVerifierProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 4, stakeholderIndex := 2, concernIndex := 2, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint {index := 5, stakeholderIndex := 2, concernIndex := 3, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 0, viewpointIndex := 0, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewNamespaceOwnerProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 1, viewpointIndex := 1, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewRegistryOperatorReservedNamespacesProtected,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 2, viewpointIndex := 2, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 3, viewpointIndex := 3, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: viewVerifierProvedGuarantees,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 4, viewpointIndex := 4, modelKindIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: viewVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::View,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::View {index := 5, viewpointIndex := 5, modelKindIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: componentRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::Component),
body: (cons (componentBrowser) (cons (componentGitHubPages) (cons (componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest) (cons (componentNamespaceAuthorizationPage) (cons (componentPrismBuild) (cons (componentProtocolClients) (cons (componentRedbStore) (cons (componentSourceRepository) (nil Foundation.Arch::Component)))))))))
}
definition{
name: edgeRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::Edge),
body: (cons (edgeBrowserToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest) (cons (edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser) (cons (edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToBrowser) (cons (edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToProtocolClients) (cons (edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToRedbStore) (cons (edgeNamespaceAuthorizationPageToGitHubPages) (cons (edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest) (cons (edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationPage) (cons (edgeProtocolClientsToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest) (cons (edgeRedbStoreToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest) (cons (edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild) (nil Foundation.Arch::Edge))))))))))))
}
definition{
name: viewpointRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint),
body: (cons (viewpointNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers) (cons (viewpointNamespaceOwnerProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewpointRegistryOperatorReservedNamespacesProtected) (cons (viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp) (cons (viewpointVerifierProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests) (nil Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint)))))))
}
definition{
name: viewRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Arch::View),
body: (cons (viewNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers) (cons (viewNamespaceOwnerProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewRegistryOperatorReservedNamespacesProtected) (cons (viewVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp) (cons (viewVerifierProvedGuarantees) (cons (viewVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests) (nil Foundation.Arch::View)))))))
}
definition{
name: edgesKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Arch::Edge)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons edge rest => (((project edge fromIndex) <? count) && (((project edge toIndex) <? count) && (edgesKnown count rest)))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: viewpointsKnown,
parameters: [
stakeholderCount : Nat,
concernCount : Nat,
records : (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint)
],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons viewpoint rest => (((project viewpoint stakeholderIndex) <? stakeholderCount) && (((project viewpoint concernIndex) <? concernCount) && (((project viewpoint modelKindIndex) <? 3) && (viewpointsKnown stakeholderCount concernCount rest))))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: viewMatches,
parameters: [view : Foundation.Arch::View, viewpoints : (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint)],
result: Bool,
body: (match viewpoints
| List.nil => false
| List.cons viewpoint rest => ((((project viewpoint index) =? (project view viewpointIndex)) && ((project viewpoint modelKindIndex) =? (project view modelKindIndex))) || (viewMatches view rest))),
recursive_argument: viewpoints
}
definition{
name: viewsConform,
parameters: [
viewpoints : (List Foundation.Arch::Viewpoint),
records : (List Foundation.Arch::View)
],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons view rest => ((viewMatches view viewpoints) && (viewsConform viewpoints rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: architectureValid,
parameters: [],
result: Bool,
body: ((edgesKnown 8 (edgeRecords)) && ((viewpointsKnown 3 5 (viewpointRecords)) && (viewsConform (viewpointRecords) (viewRecords))))
}
theorem{
name: architectureDescriptionHolds,
parameters: [],
statement: ((architectureValid) = true),
proof: decide{}
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Compliance.lex.tex 56 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Compliance}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\importmodule{Design}
\importmodule{Quality}
\importmodule{Security}
\importmodule{NamespaceAuthorization}
\title{standards reference}
\begin{semanticmodule}
structure{
name: Obligation,
type_parameters: [],
parameters: [],
fields: [
{name: index, type: Nat},
{name: standard, type: String},
{name: subject, type: String},
{name: text, type: String},
{name: evidence, type: (List String)}
]
}
definition{
name: obligations,
parameters: [],
result: (List Obligation),
body: (cons (record Obligation {index := 0, standard := "ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2022", subject := "Architecture description", text := "Stakeholders, concerns, viewpoints and views are declared and their references resolve.", evidence := (cons "Architecture::architectureDescriptionHolds" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 1, standard := "ISO/PAS 19450:2015 and OMG UML 2.5.1", subject := "Design views", text := "Every design view is checked by the SDK against the system model before it is rendered.", evidence := (cons "Design::viewOpmDecide" (cons "Design::viewUmlComponents" (cons "Design::viewUmlRequest" (cons "Design::viewUmlStates" (nil String)))))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 2, standard := "ISO/IEC 25010:2023", subject := "Product quality", text := "Characteristics, subcharacteristics, requirements and measures are numbered and their parents resolve.", evidence := (cons "Quality::qualityModelHolds" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 3, standard := "ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011 and ISO/IEC 27005:2022", subject := "Application security and risk", text := "Every threat has a STRIDE category and a mapped control with evidence, or an accepted risk with its rationale.", evidence := (cons "Security::controlSet" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 4, standard := "OASIS XACML 3.0 policy decision point", subject := "Policy decision", text := "Every well-formed request is answered with exactly one decision: permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate; a malformed one is invalid, never a decision.", evidence := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::encodeAnswer" (nil String)))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 5, standard := "OpenSpec", subject := "Requirements", text := "Every rule and property of the spec is a requirement with a scenario in openspec/specs.", evidence := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))}) (cons (record Obligation {index := 6, standard := "SPDX MIT OR Apache-2.0", subject := "Licensing", text := "The application and its model are offered under MIT OR Apache-2.0.", evidence := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))}) (nil Obligation))))))))
}
definition{
name: obligationsEvidenced,
parameters: [position : Nat, items : (List Obligation)],
result: Bool,
body: (match items
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item index) =? position) && (match{
branches: [
{body: false, binders: [], constructor: List.nil},
{body: true, binders: [first, others], constructor: List.cons}
],
scrutinee: (project item evidence)
} && (obligationsEvidenced (position + 1) rest)))),
recursive_argument: items
}
theorem{
name: everyObligationEvidenced,
parameters: [],
statement: ((obligationsEvidenced 0 (obligations)) = true),
proof: decide{}
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Design.lex.tex 654 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Design}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\importmodule{Foundation.Arch}
\title{design view}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: processSendRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: processDecide,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processParseRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processEncodeAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processBuildAndVerify,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentPrismBuild"})
}
definition{
name: processRule1,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule2,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule3,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule4,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule5,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule6,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule7,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule8,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule9,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processRule10,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: processOtherwise,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemProcess {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateIdle,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateDeciding,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateRefused,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredPermit,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredDeny,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredNotApplicable,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: stateAnsweredIndeterminate,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::SystemState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::SystemState {owner := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: viewOpmDecide,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "Deciding a Namespace authorization request", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.opmObjectProcess)})
}
definition{
name: viewUmlComponents,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "Components of Namespace authorization", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointVerifierIntegrityOfThePublishedApp", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.umlComponent)})
}
definition{
name: viewUmlRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "Answering a Namespace authorization request", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointNamespaceOwnerCorrectAnswers", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.umlSequence)})
}
definition{
name: viewUmlStates,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::DesignView,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::DesignView {title := "States of the Namespace authorization guest", viewpoint := "Architecture::viewpointVerifierRefusedMalformedRequests", diagram := (ctor Foundation.Arch::DesignDiagram.umlStateMachine)})
}
definition{
name: opmBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.object), subject := "Architecture::componentBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.object), subject := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: opmDecide,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: opmParseRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: opmJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processJudge"})
}
definition{
name: opmEncodeAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmThing,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmThing {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmThingKind.process), subject := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuestIdle,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmState {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", thing := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest", state := "Design::stateIdle"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuestDeciding,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmState {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", thing := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest", state := "Design::stateDeciding"})
}
definition{
name: opmGuestAgent,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.agent), source := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest", target := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: opmBrowserInstrument,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.instrument), source := "Architecture::componentBrowser", target := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: opmParseInvokesJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.invocation), source := "Design::processParseRequest", target := "Design::processJudge"})
}
definition{
name: opmJudgeInvokesEncode,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.invocation), source := "Design::processJudge", target := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: opmEncodeAffectsBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmLink,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmLink {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::OpmLinkKind.effect), source := "Architecture::componentBrowser", target := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: opmZoomParseRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", process := "Design::processDecide", subprocess := "Design::processParseRequest", order := 0})
}
definition{
name: opmZoomJudge,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", process := "Design::processDecide", subprocess := "Design::processJudge", order := 1})
}
definition{
name: opmZoomEncodeAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::OpmZoom {view := "Design::viewOpmDecide", process := "Design::processDecide", subprocess := "Design::processEncodeAnswer", order := 2})
}
definition{
name: umlBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: umlGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentGitHubPages"})
}
definition{
name: umlNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlNamespaceAuthorizationPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationPage"})
}
definition{
name: umlPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentPrismBuild"})
}
definition{
name: umlProtocolClients,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentProtocolClients"})
}
definition{
name: umlRedbStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentRedbStore"})
}
definition{
name: umlSourceRepository,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlComponent {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", component := "Architecture::componentSourceRepository"})
}
definition{
name: umlBrowserToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeBrowserToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlGitHubPagesToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeGitHubPagesToBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: umlNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToBrowser"})
}
definition{
name: umlNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToProtocolClients,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToProtocolClients"})
}
definition{
name: umlNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToRedbStore,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeNamespaceAuthorizationGuestToRedbStore"})
}
definition{
name: umlNamespaceAuthorizationPageToGitHubPages,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeNamespaceAuthorizationPageToGitHubPages"})
}
definition{
name: umlPrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlPrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationPage,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgePrismBuildToNamespaceAuthorizationPage"})
}
definition{
name: umlProtocolClientsToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeProtocolClientsToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlRedbStoreToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeRedbStoreToNamespaceAuthorizationGuest"})
}
definition{
name: umlSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlConnector {view := "Design::viewUmlComponents", edge := "Architecture::edgeSourceRepositoryToPrismBuild"})
}
definition{
name: seqBrowser,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", component := "Architecture::componentBrowser", order := 0})
}
definition{
name: seqNamespaceAuthorizationGuest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlLifeline {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", component := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest", order := 1})
}
definition{
name: seqRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::UmlMessageKind.synchronous), order := 0, source := "Architecture::componentBrowser", target := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest", process := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: seqReply,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlMessage {view := "Design::viewUmlRequest", kind := (ctor Foundation.Arch::UmlMessageKind.reply), order := 1, source := "Architecture::componentNamespaceAuthorizationGuest", target := "Architecture::componentBrowser", process := "Design::processDecide"})
}
definition{
name: stIdle,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateIdle", initial := true})
}
definition{
name: stDeciding,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateDeciding", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stRefused,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateRefused", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredPermit,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredDeny,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredNotApplicable,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredNotApplicable", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: stAnsweredIndeterminate,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlState,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlState {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", state := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", initial := false})
}
definition{
name: trAccept,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 0, source := "Design::stateIdle", target := "Design::stateDeciding", trigger := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: trRefuse,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 1, source := "Design::stateIdle", target := "Design::stateRefused", trigger := "Design::processParseRequest"})
}
definition{
name: trRule1,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 2, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule1"})
}
definition{
name: trRule2,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 3, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", trigger := "Design::processRule2"})
}
definition{
name: trRule3,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 4, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule3"})
}
definition{
name: trRule4,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 5, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule4"})
}
definition{
name: trRule5,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 6, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", trigger := "Design::processRule5"})
}
definition{
name: trRule6,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 7, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredNotApplicable", trigger := "Design::processRule6"})
}
definition{
name: trRule7,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 8, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule7"})
}
definition{
name: trRule8,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 9, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule8"})
}
definition{
name: trRule9,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 10, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule9"})
}
definition{
name: trRule10,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 11, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", trigger := "Design::processRule10"})
}
definition{
name: trOtherwise,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 12, source := "Design::stateDeciding", target := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", trigger := "Design::processOtherwise"})
}
definition{
name: trResetPermit,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 13, source := "Design::stateAnsweredPermit", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetDeny,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 14, source := "Design::stateAnsweredDeny", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetNotApplicable,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 15, source := "Design::stateAnsweredNotApplicable", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetIndeterminate,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 16, source := "Design::stateAnsweredIndeterminate", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
definition{
name: trResetRefused,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::UmlTransition {view := "Design::viewUmlStates", order := 17, source := "Design::stateRefused", target := "Design::stateIdle", trigger := "Design::processEncodeAnswer"})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Features.lex.tex 172 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Features}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{NamespaceAuthorization}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\importmodule{Foundation.Arch}
\title{feature}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: acceptINV001,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv001Holds"
}
definition{
name: acceptINV002,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv002Holds"
}
definition{
name: acceptINV003,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv003Holds"
}
definition{
name: acceptINV004,
parameters: [],
result: String,
body: "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv004Holds"
}
definition{
name: featureRule1,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When op is exempt, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule1" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule2,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When store is error, the answer is indeterminate.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule2" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule3,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When grant is root, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule3" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule4,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When target is none, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule4" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule5,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When target is reserved, the answer is deny.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule5" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule6,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When target is absent and op is read, the answer is not-applicable.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule6" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule7,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When target is absent, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule7" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule8,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When target is unclaimed, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule8" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule9,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When grant is not none and grant is not delegated, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule9" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRule10,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When grant is delegated and hops is at most 5, the answer is permit.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::rule10" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureOtherwise,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "When no rule matches, the answer is deny.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureRefuseMalformed,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "A request that is not op, store, target, grant, hops in order, separated by single spaces, or is over 136 bytes, is answered invalid.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::dispatch" (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::decodeField1" (nil String))), acceptance := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::application" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV001" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV002" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV003" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: featureINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Feature,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Feature {statement := "It always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt.", calls := (cons "NamespaceAuthorization::judge" (nil String)), acceptance := (cons "Features::acceptINV004" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: journeyNamespaceOwner,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Journey,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Journey {actor := "Architecture::stakeholderNamespaceOwner", steps := (cons "Features::featureRule9" (cons "Features::featureRule10" (cons "Features::featureOtherwise" (cons "Features::featureINV001" (cons "Features::featureINV002" (nil String))))))})
}
definition{
name: journeyRegistryOperator,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Journey,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Journey {actor := "Architecture::stakeholderRegistryOperator", steps := (cons "Features::featureRule3" (cons "Features::featureRule5" (cons "Features::featureRule7" (cons "Features::featureINV003" (nil String)))))})
}
definition{
name: journeyVerifier,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Arch::Journey,
body: (record Foundation.Arch::Journey {actor := "Architecture::stakeholderVerifier", steps := (cons "Features::featureRefuseMalformed" (cons "Features::featureINV001" (cons "Features::featureINV002" (cons "Features::featureINV003" (cons "Features::featureINV004" (nil String))))))})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Quality.lex.tex 354 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Quality}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\useglossary{prism.qual@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Qual}
\title{quality measure}
\begin{semanticmodule}
structure{
name: Named,
type_parameters: [],
parameters: [],
fields: [{name: index, type: Nat}, {name: name, type: String}, {name: text, type: String}]
}
definition{
name: characteristicFunctionalSuitability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 0})
}
definition{
name: characteristicPerformanceEfficiency,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 1})
}
definition{
name: characteristicReliability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 2})
}
definition{
name: characteristicSecurity,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::ProductQualityCharacteristic {index := 3})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicFaultlessness,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 0, characteristicIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicFunctionalCompleteness,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 1, characteristicIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicFunctionalCorrectness,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 2, characteristicIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicIntegrity,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 3, characteristicIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicResistance,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 4, characteristicIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicResourceUtilization,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 5, characteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicTimeBehaviour,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic {index := 6, characteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: requirementBoundedAllocation,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 0, subcharacteristicIndex := 5})
}
definition{
name: requirementBoundedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 1, subcharacteristicIndex := 6})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryPropertyProved,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 2, subcharacteristicIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryRequestAnswered,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 3, subcharacteristicIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: requirementEveryVectorReplays,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 4, subcharacteristicIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: requirementExamplesAnsweredAsStated,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 5, subcharacteristicIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: requirementNoAuthorityNoWrite,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement {index := 6, subcharacteristicIndex := 4})
}
definition{
name: measureExampleMismatches,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 0, requirementIndex := 5, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureFailedVectors,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 1, requirementIndex := 4, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureGuestAllocationBytes,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 2, requirementIndex := 0, threshold := 272})
}
definition{
name: measureRequestBytesRead,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 3, requirementIndex := 1, threshold := 136})
}
definition{
name: measureUnansweredRequests,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 4, requirementIndex := 3, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureUnauthorizedPermits,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 5, requirementIndex := 6, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: measureUnprovedProperties,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure,
body: (record Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure {index := 6, requirementIndex := 2, threshold := 0})
}
definition{
name: characteristicNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Functional suitability", text := "Functional suitability, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Namespace authorization."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Performance efficiency", text := "Performance efficiency, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Namespace authorization."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Reliability", text := "Reliability, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Namespace authorization."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Security", text := "Security, as ISO/IEC 25010:2023 defines it, for Namespace authorization."}) (nil Named)))))
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Faultlessness", text := "Reliability: Faultlessness."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Functional completeness", text := "Functional suitability: Functional completeness."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Functional correctness", text := "Functional suitability: Functional correctness."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Integrity", text := "Security: Integrity."}) (cons (record Named {index := 4, name := "Resistance", text := "Security: Resistance."}) (cons (record Named {index := 5, name := "Resource utilization", text := "Performance efficiency: Resource utilization."}) (cons (record Named {index := 6, name := "Time behaviour", text := "Performance efficiency: Time behaviour."}) (nil Named))))))))
}
definition{
name: requirementNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Bounded allocation", text := "The guest allocates at most 272 bytes for one request."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Bounded request", text := "A request over 136 bytes is refused before any field is read."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Every property proved", text := "All 4 properties are theorems the Lean kernel checks."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Every request answered", text := "Every request gets an answer: a rule, deny otherwise, or invalid."}) (cons (record Named {index := 4, name := "Every vector replays", text := "All 52 acceptance vectors replay in the compiled guest, the shortest 0 bytes long."}) (cons (record Named {index := 5, name := "Examples answered as stated", text := "Every one of the 9 examples of the spec is answered as it states."}) (cons (record Named {index := 6, name := "No authority, no write", text := "No read, write or admin of a claimed namespace is permitted without an owner, capability, role or delegation within five hops."}) (nil Named))))))))
}
definition{
name: measureNames,
parameters: [],
result: (List Named),
body: (cons (record Named {index := 0, name := "Example mismatches", text := "Examples the guest answers otherwise than they state."}) (cons (record Named {index := 1, name := "Failed vectors", text := "Acceptance vectors whose replay differs from the model."}) (cons (record Named {index := 2, name := "Guest allocation bytes", text := "Most bytes the guest allocates for one request."}) (cons (record Named {index := 3, name := "Request bytes read", text := "Longest request the guest decodes, in bytes."}) (cons (record Named {index := 4, name := "Unanswered requests", text := "Acceptance vectors the guest does not answer."}) (cons (record Named {index := 5, name := "Unauthorized permits", text := "Requests with no grant on a claimed namespace answered permit."}) (cons (record Named {index := 6, name := "Unproved properties", text := "Properties of the spec without a checked theorem."}) (nil Named))))))))
}
definition{
name: subcharacteristicRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic),
body: (cons (subcharacteristicFaultlessness) (cons (subcharacteristicFunctionalCompleteness) (cons (subcharacteristicFunctionalCorrectness) (cons (subcharacteristicIntegrity) (cons (subcharacteristicResistance) (cons (subcharacteristicResourceUtilization) (cons (subcharacteristicTimeBehaviour) (nil Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic))))))))
}
definition{
name: requirementRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement),
body: (cons (requirementBoundedAllocation) (cons (requirementBoundedRequest) (cons (requirementEveryPropertyProved) (cons (requirementEveryRequestAnswered) (cons (requirementEveryVectorReplays) (cons (requirementExamplesAnsweredAsStated) (cons (requirementNoAuthorityNoWrite) (nil Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement))))))))
}
definition{
name: measureRecords,
parameters: [],
result: (List Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure),
body: (cons (measureExampleMismatches) (cons (measureFailedVectors) (cons (measureGuestAllocationBytes) (cons (measureRequestBytesRead) (cons (measureUnansweredRequests) (cons (measureUnauthorizedPermits) (cons (measureUnprovedProperties) (nil Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure))))))))
}
definition{
name: namesNumbered,
parameters: [position : Nat, names : (List Named)],
result: Bool,
body: (match names
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item index) =? position) && (namesNumbered (position + 1) rest))),
recursive_argument: names
}
definition{
name: parentsKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualitySubcharacteristic)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item characteristicIndex) <? count) && (parentsKnown count rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: requirementsKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualityRequirement)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item subcharacteristicIndex) <? count) && (requirementsKnown count rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: measuresKnown,
parameters: [count : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure)],
result: Bool,
body: (match records
| List.nil => true
| List.cons item rest => (((project item requirementIndex) <? count) && (measuresKnown count rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: thresholdOf,
parameters: [wanted : Nat, records : (List Foundation.Qual::QualityMeasure)],
result: Nat,
body: (match records
| List.nil => 0
| List.cons head rest => (if ((project head index) =? wanted) then (project head threshold) else (thresholdOf wanted rest))),
recursive_argument: records
}
definition{
name: qualityValid,
parameters: [],
result: Bool,
body: ((namesNumbered 0 (characteristicNames)) && ((namesNumbered 0 (subcharacteristicNames)) && ((namesNumbered 0 (requirementNames)) && ((namesNumbered 0 (measureNames)) && ((parentsKnown 4 (subcharacteristicRecords)) && ((requirementsKnown 7 (requirementRecords)) && (measuresKnown 7 (measureRecords))))))))
}
theorem{
name: qualityModelHolds,
parameters: [],
statement: ((qualityValid) = true),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureExampleMismatchesThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 0 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureFailedVectorsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 1 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureGuestAllocationBytesThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 2 (measureRecords)) = 272),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureRequestBytesReadThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 3 (measureRecords)) = 136),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUnansweredRequestsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 4 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUnauthorizedPermitsThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 5 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
theorem{
name: measureUnprovedPropertiesThreshold,
parameters: [],
statement: ((thresholdOf 6 (measureRecords)) = 0),
proof: decide{}
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/Security.lex.tex 593 lines
\begin{lexlean}{Security}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\useglossary{prism.sec@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Sec}
\importmodule{Production.ThreatModel}
\importmodule{Architecture}
\title{security threat}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: assetAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 0, componentIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: assetModelSource,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 1, componentIndex := 7})
}
definition{
name: assetPublishedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 2, componentIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: assetRequestBytes,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Asset,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Asset {index := 3, componentIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 0})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 1})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 2})
}
definition{
name: threatAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 3})
}
definition{
name: threatDelegationAssertedByAThirdParty,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 4})
}
definition{
name: threatFailOpenOnAnEdgeQueryError,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 5})
}
definition{
name: threatGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 6})
}
definition{
name: threatMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 7})
}
definition{
name: threatOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 8})
}
definition{
name: threatSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 9})
}
definition{
name: threatSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 10})
}
definition{
name: threatTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 11})
}
definition{
name: threatUnboundedDelegationWalk,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Threat,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Threat {index := 12})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 0, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 0, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 1, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 1, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 2, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 2, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 3, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 3, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskDelegationAssertedByAThirdParty,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 4, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 4, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskFailOpenOnAnEdgeQueryError,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 5, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 5, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 6, assetIndex := 0, threatIndex := 6, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 7, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 7, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.high), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 8, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 8, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.medium), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.minor)})
}
definition{
name: riskSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 9, assetIndex := 2, threatIndex := 9, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 10, assetIndex := 2, threatIndex := 10, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.critical)})
}
definition{
name: riskTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 11, assetIndex := 1, threatIndex := 11, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: riskUnboundedDelegationWalk,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::Risk,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::Risk {index := 12, assetIndex := 3, threatIndex := 12, likelihood := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Likelihood.low), impact := (ctor Foundation.Sec::Impact.major)})
}
definition{
name: controlBoundedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 0, riskIndex := 8})
}
definition{
name: controlFingerprintAndProvenance,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 1, riskIndex := 9})
}
definition{
name: controlFiveHops,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 2, riskIndex := 12})
}
definition{
name: controlNoCapabilityGranted,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 3, riskIndex := 6})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 4, riskIndex := 0})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 5, riskIndex := 1})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 6, riskIndex := 2})
}
definition{
name: controlProofOfINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 7, riskIndex := 3})
}
definition{
name: controlRegeneratedFromThePrompt,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 8, riskIndex := 11})
}
definition{
name: controlSourceMustAssert,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 9, riskIndex := 4})
}
definition{
name: controlStrictDecoder,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl,
body: (record Foundation.Sec::ApplicationSecurityControl {index := 10, riskIndex := 7})
}
definition{
name: controlSet,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ControlSet,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ControlSet {title := "Namespace authorization security controls", text := "Namespace authorization answers one request with one answer in a Core-Wasm guest granted no capability. Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes.", version := "0.1.0", lastModified := "2026-11-12T18:44:38Z"})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetAnswer,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetAnswer", name := "Answer", text := "The answer the guest returns: one of permit, deny, not-applicable, indeterminate, or invalid."})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetModelSource,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetModelSource", name := "Model source", text := "The prompt, the spec and the LexLean model in the repository, from which the holo is built."})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetPublishedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetPublishedHolo", name := "Published holo", text := "The holo and page the Pages workflow publishes, with its fingerprint and signed provenance."})
}
definition{
name: modeledAssetRequestBytes,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledAsset {asset := "Security::assetRequestBytes", name := "Request bytes", text := "The bytes a caller sends, at most 136 of them."})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV001", name := "Answer that breaks INV-001", text := "The guest answers permit although op is read and target is existing and grant is none, which matters because a claimed namespace is never read without authority.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV002", name := "Answer that breaks INV-002", text := "The guest answers permit although target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt, which matters because the delegation walk is bounded at five hops.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV003", name := "Answer that breaks INV-003", text := "The guest answers permit although target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt, which matters because a reserved namespace needs _root authority.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV004", name := "Answer that breaks INV-004", text := "The guest answers indeterminate not when store is error and op is not exempt, which matters because a store error never becomes a permit or a deny.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.repudiation)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatDelegationAssertedByAThirdParty,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatDelegationAssertedByAThirdParty", name := "Delegation asserted by a third party", text := "Someone other than the source writes a delegation edge on its behalf to grant themselves access.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.spoofing)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatFailOpenOnAnEdgeQueryError,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatFailOpenOnAnEdgeQueryError", name := "Fail-open on an edge query error", text := "Step 3's edge query for an unclaimed namespace answers Allowed when the store errors.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.elevationOfPrivilege)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatGrantedCapability", name := "Granted capability", text := "The guest reads, stores or sends data beyond the request it answers.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.informationDisclosure)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatMalformedRequest", name := "Malformed request", text := "A request with a missing, extra, unknown or badly written field is answered as if it were well formed.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.tampering)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatOversizedRequest", name := "Oversized request", text := "A request longer than 136 bytes makes the guest parse or allocate without bound.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.denialOfService)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHolo", name := "Substituted holo", text := "A holo other than the one the build verified is served under the app address.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.spoofing)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHost", name := "Substituted host", text := "Something other than the repository Pages workflow serves pages under its address.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.spoofing)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatTamperedModel", name := "Tampered model", text := "The model the holo is built from differs from the reviewed prompt and spec.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.tampering)})
}
definition{
name: modeledThreatUnboundedDelegationWalk,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledThreat {threat := "Security::threatUnboundedDelegationWalk", name := "Unbounded delegation walk", text := "A long or cyclic delegation chain makes authorization walk without end or grants access far down a chain.", category := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::Stride.denialOfService)})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlBoundedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlBoundedRequest", name := "Bounded request", text := "dispatch answers invalid for a request over 136 bytes before reading a field, and the guest allocates at most 272.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "acceptance vectors at the request bound, one byte over it, and at the guest allocation bound, replayed by prismpm verify"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlFingerprintAndProvenance,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlFingerprintAndProvenance", name := "Fingerprint and provenance", text := "The page verifies the holo digests before it runs, and the build signs its provenance as the repository workflow.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "actions/attest-build-provenance in the pages workflow"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "prism-code check of the holo identities in the page"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlFiveHops,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlFiveHops", name := "Five hops", text := "The walk stops after hop 5, and beyond it nothing is permitted, proved for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "KappaDominanceProofs::inv002Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlNoCapabilityGranted,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlNoCapabilityGranted", name := "No capability granted", text := "prism.toml grants the holo nothing and the model declares capabilitiesEmpty, so a guest import of any host capability is refused.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "prism-code check refuses an ungranted guest import"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV001", name := "Proof of INV-001", text := "It never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv001Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV002", name := "Proof of INV-002", text := "It never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv002Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV003", name := "Proof of INV-003", text := "It never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv003Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlProofOfINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlProofOfINV004", name := "Proof of INV-004", text := "It always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt. The Lean kernel proves it for every request.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.proof), reference := "NamespaceAuthorizationProofs::inv004Holds"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlRegeneratedFromThePrompt,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlRegeneratedFromThePrompt", name := "Regenerated from the prompt", text := "The model is written from the prompt by the builder, and the build checks every theorem and replays every vector in the pinned SDK.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "prismpm verify in the SDK image prismpm.lock pins"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.review), reference := "app/prompt.json"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlSourceMustAssert,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlSourceMustAssert", name := "Source must assert", text := "A delegation counts only if its asserter is its source.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.review), reference := "crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs check_delegation_inner"}) (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "crates/kappa-server/tests/integration/delegation.rs"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence)))})
}
definition{
name: modeledControlStrictDecoder,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ModeledControl {control := "Security::controlStrictDecoder", name := "Strict decoder", text := "Every field is decoded exactly: choices from their list, numbers as plain decimal digits within their bounds, single spaces between fields; anything else is invalid.", evidence := (cons (record Production.ThreatModel::Evidence {kind := (ctor Production.ThreatModel::EvidenceKind.gate), reference := "malformed-request acceptance vectors, replayed in the compiled guest by prismpm verify"}) (nil Production.ThreatModel::Evidence))})
}
definition{
name: mappingOversizedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatOversizedRequest", controls := (cons "Security::controlBoundedRequest" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingSubstitutedHolo,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHolo", controls := (cons "Security::controlFingerprintAndProvenance" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingUnboundedDelegationWalk,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatUnboundedDelegationWalk", controls := (cons "Security::controlFiveHops" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingGrantedCapability,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatGrantedCapability", controls := (cons "Security::controlNoCapabilityGranted" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV001,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV001", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV001" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV002,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV002", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV002" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV003,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV003", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV003" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingAnswerThatBreaksINV004,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatAnswerThatBreaksINV004", controls := (cons "Security::controlProofOfINV004" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingTamperedModel,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatTamperedModel", controls := (cons "Security::controlRegeneratedFromThePrompt" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingDelegationAssertedByAThirdParty,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatDelegationAssertedByAThirdParty", controls := (cons "Security::controlSourceMustAssert" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: mappingMalformedRequest,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::ThreatMapping {threat := "Security::threatMalformedRequest", controls := (cons "Security::controlStrictDecoder" (nil String))})
}
definition{
name: acceptedFailOpenOnAnEdgeQueryError,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::AcceptedRisk,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::AcceptedRisk {threat := "Security::threatFailOpenOnAnEdgeQueryError", rationale := "The app models a store error as indeterminate; auth.rs step 3 allows on an edge-query error, a fail-open recorded here for the repository to review."})
}
definition{
name: acceptedSubstitutedHost,
parameters: [],
result: Production.ThreatModel::AcceptedRisk,
body: (record Production.ThreatModel::AcceptedRisk {threat := "Security::threatSubstitutedHost", rationale := "A page cannot defend against its own host. The holo carries signed build provenance a visitor can check, and the app can be rebuilt from its prompt."})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex 319 lines
\begin{lexlean}{NamespaceAuthorization}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{Foundation.Bytes}
\importmodule{Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model}
\title{Text application model}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{name: opExempt, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: opRead, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: opWrite, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 2}
definition{name: opAdmin, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 3}
definition{name: storeOk, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: storeError, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: targetExisting, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: targetUnclaimed, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: targetAbsent, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 2}
definition{name: targetReserved, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 3}
definition{name: targetNone, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 4}
definition{name: grantNone, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: grantRoot, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: grantOwner, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 2}
definition{name: grantDirect, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 3}
definition{name: grantParent, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 4}
definition{name: grantRole, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 5}
definition{name: grantDelegated, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 6}
definition{name: answerPermit, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 0}
definition{name: answerDeny, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 1}
definition{name: answerNotApplicable, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 2}
definition{name: answerIndeterminate, parameters: [], result: Nat, body: 3}
structure{
name: Request,
type_parameters: [],
parameters: [],
fields: [
{name: op, type: Nat},
{name: store, type: Nat},
{name: target, type: Nat},
{name: grant, type: Nat},
{name: hops, type: Nat}
]
}
definition{
name: byteAt,
parameters: [s : Bytes, i : Nat],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (match (prim index s i : (Option UInt8))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some b => (ctor Option.some [Nat] (prim to_nat b : Nat))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: digitsValue,
parameters: [s : Bytes, i : Nat, acc : Nat, fuel : Nat],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (match fuel
| Nat.zero => (ctor Option.some [Nat] acc)
| Nat.succ rest => (match (byteAt s i)
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some d => (if ((d <? 48) || (57 <? d)) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (digitsValue s (i + 1) ((prim multiply acc 10 : Nat) + (prim subtract d 48 : Nat)) rest)))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext],
recursive_argument: fuel
}
definition{
name: parseDigits,
parameters: [s : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if ((Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s) =? 0) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (if (18 <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (match (byteAt s 0)
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some lead => (if ((lead =? 48) && (1 <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s))) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (digitsValue s 0 0 (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)))))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: parseNumber,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (parseDigits value),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: parseOp,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x6578656d7074 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (opExempt)) else (if (prim equal value 0x72656164 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (opRead)) else (if (prim equal value 0x7772697465 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (opWrite)) else (if (prim equal value 0x61646d696e : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (opAdmin)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat])))))
}
definition{
name: parseStore,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x6f6b : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (storeOk)) else (if (prim equal value 0x6572726f72 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (storeError)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat])))
}
definition{
name: parseTarget,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x6578697374696e67 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (targetExisting)) else (if (prim equal value 0x756e636c61696d6564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (targetUnclaimed)) else (if (prim equal value 0x616273656e74 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (targetAbsent)) else (if (prim equal value 0x7265736572766564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (targetReserved)) else (if (prim equal value 0x6e6f6e65 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (targetNone)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat]))))))
}
definition{
name: parseGrant,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (if (prim equal value 0x6e6f6e65 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantNone)) else (if (prim equal value 0x726f6f74 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantRoot)) else (if (prim equal value 0x6f776e6572 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantOwner)) else (if (prim equal value 0x646972656374 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantDirect)) else (if (prim equal value 0x706172656e74 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantParent)) else (if (prim equal value 0x726f6c65 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantRole)) else (if (prim equal value 0x64656c656761746564 : Bool) then (ctor Option.some [Nat] (grantDelegated)) else (ctor Option.none [Nat]))))))))
}
definition{
name: parseHops,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: (Option Nat),
body: (match (parseNumber value)
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Nat])
| Option.some parsed => (if (10 <? parsed) then (ctor Option.none [Nat]) else (ctor Option.some [Nat] parsed))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: sliceOf,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, count : Nat],
result: Bytes,
body: (match (prim slice s start count : (Option Bytes))
| Option.none => 0x
| Option.some part => part)
}
definition{
name: fieldEnd,
parameters: [s : Bytes, i : Nat, fuel : Nat],
result: Nat,
body: (match fuel
| Nat.zero => i
| Nat.succ rest => (match (byteAt s i)
| Option.none => i
| Option.some d => (if (d =? 32) then i else (fieldEnd s (i + 1) rest)))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext],
recursive_argument: fuel
}
definition{
name: decodeField5,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat, v2 : Nat, v3 : Nat, v4 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseHops (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v5 => (if (e =? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (ctor Option.some [Request] (record Request {op := v1, store := v2, target := v3, grant := v4, hops := v5})) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField4,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat, v2 : Nat, v3 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseGrant (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v4 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField5 s (e + 1) v1 v2 v3 v4) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField3,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat, v2 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseTarget (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v3 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField4 s (e + 1) v1 v2 v3) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField2,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat, v1 : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseStore (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v2 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField3 s (e + 1) v1 v2) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: decodeField1,
parameters: [s : Bytes, start : Nat],
result: (Option Request),
body: (let e : Nat := (fieldEnd s start (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)); (match (parseOp (sliceOf s start (prim subtract e start : Nat)))
| Option.none => (ctor Option.none [Request])
| Option.some v1 => (if (e <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength s)) then (decodeField2 s (e + 1) v1) else (ctor Option.none [Request])))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: rule1,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request op) =? (opExempt))
}
definition{
name: rule2,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request store) =? (storeError))
}
definition{
name: rule3,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request grant) =? (grantRoot))
}
definition{
name: rule4,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request target) =? (targetNone))
}
definition{
name: rule5,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request target) =? (targetReserved))
}
definition{
name: rule6,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((project request target) =? (targetAbsent)) && ((project request op) =? (opRead)))
}
definition{
name: rule7,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request target) =? (targetAbsent))
}
definition{
name: rule8,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((project request target) =? (targetUnclaimed))
}
definition{
name: rule9,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((not ((project request grant) =? (grantNone))) && (not ((project request grant) =? (grantDelegated))))
}
definition{
name: rule10,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((project request grant) =? (grantDelegated)) && ((project request hops) <=? 5))
}
definition{
name: judge,
parameters: [request : Request],
result: Nat,
body: (if (rule1 request) then (answerPermit) else (if (rule2 request) then (answerIndeterminate) else (if (rule3 request) then (answerPermit) else (if (rule4 request) then (answerPermit) else (if (rule5 request) then (answerDeny) else (if (rule6 request) then (answerNotApplicable) else (if (rule7 request) then (answerPermit) else (if (rule8 request) then (answerPermit) else (if (rule9 request) then (answerPermit) else (if (rule10 request) then (answerPermit) else (answerDeny)))))))))))
}
definition{
name: encodeAnswer,
parameters: [code : Nat],
result: Bytes,
body: (if (code =? (answerPermit)) then 0x7065726d6974 else (if (code =? (answerDeny)) then 0x64656e79 else (if (code =? (answerNotApplicable)) then 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65 else (if (code =? (answerIndeterminate)) then 0x696e64657465726d696e617465 else 0x696e76616c6964))))
}
definition{
name: dispatch,
parameters: [value : Bytes],
result: Bytes,
body: (if (136 <? (Foundation.Bytes::byteLength value)) then 0x696e76616c6964 else (match (decodeField1 value 0)
| Option.none => 0x696e76616c6964
| Option.some request => (encodeAnswer (judge request)))),
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: application,
parameters: [],
result: Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::TextApplication,
body: (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::TextApplication {profile := "prismpm/text-application/1", name := "Namespace authorization", cargoName := "prism-namespace-authorization", cargoVersion := "0.1.0", cargoDescription := "Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter ho", cargoRepository := "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/PrismPM", cargoHomepage := "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/PrismPM", libraryRoots := (cons "PrismNamespaceAuthorization.NamespaceAuthorization.dispatch" (nil String)), acceptanceVectors := (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x72656164206f6b206578697374696e67206f776e65722030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x72656164206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e652030, response := 0x64656e79}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7772697465206f6b20616273656e74206e6f6e652030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x72656164206f6b20616273656e74206e6f6e652030, response := 0x6e6f742d6170706c696361626c65}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x61646d696e206f6b207265736572766564206e6f6e652030, response := 0x64656e79}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7772697465206f6b206578697374696e672064656c6567617465642035, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7772697465206f6b206578697374696e672064656c6567617465642036, response := 0x64656e79}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x72656164206572726f72206578697374696e67206f776e65722030, response := 0x696e64657465726d696e617465}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206572726f72206e6f6e65206e6f6e652030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e652030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e652036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e6720726f6f742030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e6720726f6f742036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206f776e65722030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206f776e65722036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e672064656c6567617465642030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e672064656c6567617465642036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d6564206e6f6e652030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d6564206e6f6e652036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d656420726f6f742030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d656420726f6f742036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d6564206f776e65722030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d6564206f776e65722036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d65642064656c6567617465642030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e636c61696d65642064656c6567617465642036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e74206e6f6e652030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e74206e6f6e652036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e7420726f6f742030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e7420726f6f742036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e74206f776e65722030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e74206f776e65722036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e742064656c6567617465642030, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20616273656e742064656c6567617465642036, response := 0x7065726d6974}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0xff, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e65, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e6520302030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d707420206f6b20206578697374696e6720206e6f6e65202030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x756e6b6e6f776e206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e652030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d707420756e6b6e6f776e206578697374696e67206e6f6e652030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b20756e6b6e6f776e206e6f6e652030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e6720756e6b6e6f776e2030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e65203037, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e65202d31, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e65202b31, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e652031303030303030303030303030303030303030, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e6520d9a1, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e652078, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x6578656d7074206f6b206578697374696e67206e6f6e65203131, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x78787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (cons (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector {request := 0x7878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878787878, response := 0x696e76616c6964}) (nil Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::AcceptanceVector))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))), entryRoot := "PrismNamespaceAuthorization.NamespaceAuthorization.dispatch", coreContract := "hologram:guest/core-wasm@1", requestMaximum := (136 : UInt32), responseMaximum := (64 : UInt32), guestAllocationMaximum := (272 : UInt32), capabilitiesEmpty := true, fatArchive := true, primaryLayer := (0 : UInt8), viewLayer := (1 : UInt8), view := (record Foundation.View.Text.V1.Model::TextView {title := "Namespace authorization", heading := "Namespace authorization", inputLabel := "Request: op store target grant hops", submitLabel := "Decide", outputLabel := "Answer", inputError := "Invalid request", responseError := "Invalid response"})})
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex 217 lines
\begin{lexlean}{NamespaceAuthorizationProofs}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.bool@1.2.0}
\useglossary{lexlean.std.nat@1.2.0}
\useglossary{prism.arch@1.0.0}
\importmodule{NamespaceAuthorization}
\title{Text application model}
\begin{semanticmodule}
definition{
name: breaksInv001,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opRead))) && ((project request target) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting))) && ((project request grant) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::grantNone))) && ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit)))
}
theorem{
name: inv001Holds,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv001 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
NamespaceAuthorization::answerDeny,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerIndeterminate,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerNotApplicable,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDelegated,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDirect,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantOwner,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantParent,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRole,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRoot,
NamespaceAuthorization::judge,
NamespaceAuthorization::opAdmin,
NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt,
NamespaceAuthorization::opRead,
NamespaceAuthorization::opWrite,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule1,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule10,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule2,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule3,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule4,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule5,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule6,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule7,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule8,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule9,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeError,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeOk,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetAbsent,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetReserved,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetUnclaimed,
breaksInv001
]
},
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: breaksInv002,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request target) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting))) && ((project request grant) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::grantDelegated))) && (5 <? (project request hops))) && (not ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt)))) && ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit)))
}
theorem{
name: inv002Holds,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv002 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
NamespaceAuthorization::answerDeny,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerIndeterminate,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerNotApplicable,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDelegated,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDirect,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantOwner,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantParent,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRole,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRoot,
NamespaceAuthorization::judge,
NamespaceAuthorization::opAdmin,
NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt,
NamespaceAuthorization::opRead,
NamespaceAuthorization::opWrite,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule1,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule10,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule2,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule3,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule4,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule5,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule6,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule7,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule8,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule9,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeError,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeOk,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetAbsent,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetReserved,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetUnclaimed,
breaksInv002
]
},
axioms: [Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: breaksInv003,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
result: Bool,
body: ((((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request target) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::targetReserved))) && (not ((project request grant) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::grantRoot)))) && (not ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt)))) && ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit)))
}
theorem{
name: inv003Holds,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv003 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
NamespaceAuthorization::answerDeny,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerIndeterminate,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerNotApplicable,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDelegated,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDirect,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantOwner,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantParent,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRole,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRoot,
NamespaceAuthorization::judge,
NamespaceAuthorization::opAdmin,
NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt,
NamespaceAuthorization::opRead,
NamespaceAuthorization::opWrite,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule1,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule10,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule2,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule3,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule4,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule5,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule6,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule7,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule8,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule9,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeError,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeOk,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetAbsent,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetReserved,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetUnclaimed,
breaksInv003
]
},
axioms: [Classical.choice, Quot.sound, propext]
}
definition{
name: breaksInv004,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
result: Bool,
body: (((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request store) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::storeError))) && (not ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt)))) && (not ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerIndeterminate))))
}
theorem{
name: inv004Holds,
parameters: [request : NamespaceAuthorization::Request],
statement: ((breaksInv004 request) = false),
proof: linear_arithmetic{
definitions: [
NamespaceAuthorization::answerDeny,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerIndeterminate,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerNotApplicable,
NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDelegated,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantDirect,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantOwner,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantParent,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRole,
NamespaceAuthorization::grantRoot,
NamespaceAuthorization::judge,
NamespaceAuthorization::opAdmin,
NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt,
NamespaceAuthorization::opRead,
NamespaceAuthorization::opWrite,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule1,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule10,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule2,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule3,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule4,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule5,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule6,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule7,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule8,
NamespaceAuthorization::rule9,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeError,
NamespaceAuthorization::storeOk,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetAbsent,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetNone,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetReserved,
NamespaceAuthorization::targetUnclaimed,
breaksInv004
]
},
axioms: [Classical.choice, Quot.sound, propext]
}
\end{semanticmodule}
\end{lexlean}
app/lexlean.toml 43 lines
spec = "lexlean/project/1"
name = "prism-namespace-authorization"
language = "1.2"
module_prefix = "PrismNamespaceAuthorization"
source_roots = ["src"]
entrypoints = ["src/Architecture.lex.tex", "src/Compliance.lex.tex", "src/Design.lex.tex", "src/Features.lex.tex", "src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex", "src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex", "src/Quality.lex.tex", "src/Security.lex.tex"]
build_root = ".lexlean"
lockfile = "lexlean.lock"
lean_workspace = "."
lean_toolchain = "leanprover/lean4:v4.32.1"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "lexlean.std.nat"
kind = "builtin"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "prism.arch"
kind = "path"
path = "language/prism.arch"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "prism.qual"
kind = "path"
path = "language/prism.qual"
[[lexicon_source]]
package = "prism.sec"
kind = "path"
path = "language/prism.sec"
[limits]
max_file_bytes = 4194304
max_total_source_bytes = 67108864
max_primitive_atoms = 2000000
max_token_lattice_edges = 4000000
max_parse_states = 4000000
max_ir_nodes = 2000000
max_scope_depth = 1024
max_import_depth = 128
max_diagnostics = 256
max_child_output_bytes = 16777216
child_timeout_ms = 300000
app/prompt.json 472 lines
{
"schema": "prism/prompt/1",
"goal": "Decide if kappa-registry lets someone change a namespace. Only its owner, a key holder or a short chain of trust can write.",
"pattern": "policyDecision",
"repository": "UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry",
"app": {
"name": "namespace-authorization",
"limits": [
"It does not resolve namespaces or walk edges; it decides from the authority the walk found.",
"The redb store and the identity system are outside it."
],
"title": "Namespace authorization",
"purpose": "Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes.",
"fields": [
{
"name": "op",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"exempt",
"read",
"write",
"admin"
],
"means": "the operation class"
},
{
"name": "store",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"ok",
"error"
],
"means": "whether the store answered the delegation walk"
},
{
"name": "target",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"existing",
"unclaimed",
"absent",
"reserved",
"none"
],
"means": "the namespace: claimed, existing with no capability edges, absent, absent and reserved, or none"
},
{
"name": "grant",
"kind": "choice",
"values": [
"none",
"root",
"owner",
"direct",
"parent",
"role",
"delegated"
],
"means": "the first authority the asserter holds, in authorize's order"
},
{
"name": "hops",
"kind": "number",
"min": 0,
"means": "delegation hops walked to a capability holder",
"max": 10
}
],
"outcomes": [
"permit",
"deny",
"not-applicable",
"indeterminate"
],
"meanings": {
"permit": "Allowed, AllowCreateNew or AllowedViaDelegation",
"deny": "Forbidden: access denied, or a reserved namespace needs _root authority",
"not-applicable": "NotFound: a read of a namespace that does not exist",
"indeterminate": "a store error during the auth check, so no decision is made"
},
"rules": [
{
"when": [
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs authorize: an Exempt operation is Allowed before any check"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "store",
"op": "is",
"value": "error"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "auth.rs: a store error in the delegation walk is AuthError::Store, not a decision"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "root"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs step 1: a capability on _root allows any namespace"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "none"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs: ResolvedNamespace::NoNamespace is Allowed"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "reserved"
}
],
"then": "deny",
"why": "auth.rs: an absent reserved namespace requires _root authority"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "absent"
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is",
"value": "read"
}
],
"then": "not-applicable",
"why": "auth.rs: reading an absent namespace is AuthError::NotFound"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "absent"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs: a write to an absent non-reserved namespace is AllowCreateNew, first writer claims"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "unclaimed"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs step 3: a non-reserved namespace with no capability edges is open"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is not",
"value": "none"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is not",
"value": "delegated"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs steps 2, 4, 5 and 6: owner, direct capability, parent namespace or held role"
},
{
"when": [
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "delegated"
},
{
"field": "hops",
"op": "<=",
"value": 5
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "auth.rs check_delegation_inner: a delegation chain counts up to hop 5, AllowedViaDelegation"
}
],
"otherwise": "deny",
"otherwiseWhy": "auth.rs: no authority found, Forbidden access denied",
"properties": [
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is",
"value": "read"
},
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "existing"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "none"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "a claimed namespace is never read without authority"
},
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "existing"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is",
"value": "delegated"
},
{
"field": "hops",
"op": ">",
"value": 5
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is not",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "the delegation walk is bounded at five hops"
},
{
"kind": "never",
"when": [
{
"field": "target",
"op": "is",
"value": "reserved"
},
{
"field": "grant",
"op": "is not",
"value": "root"
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is not",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "permit",
"why": "a reserved namespace needs _root authority"
},
{
"kind": "always",
"when": [
{
"field": "store",
"op": "is",
"value": "error"
},
{
"field": "op",
"op": "is not",
"value": "exempt"
}
],
"then": "indeterminate",
"why": "a store error never becomes a permit or a deny"
}
],
"examples": [
{
"request": "read ok existing owner 0",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "read ok existing none 0",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "write ok absent none 0",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "read ok absent none 0",
"response": "not-applicable"
},
{
"request": "admin ok reserved none 0",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "write ok existing delegated 5",
"response": "permit"
},
{
"request": "write ok existing delegated 6",
"response": "deny"
},
{
"request": "read error existing owner 0",
"response": "indeterminate"
},
{
"request": "exempt error none none 0",
"response": "permit"
}
]
},
"stakeholders": [
{
"name": "Namespace owner",
"text": "Owns a namespace and needs nothing but an owner, a capability holder or a bounded delegation to write to it.",
"concerns": [
"Proved guarantees",
"Correct answers"
]
},
{
"name": "Registry operator",
"text": "Runs the single-binary server for Docker, Git, S3, Nix and AT Protocol clients and needs reserved namespaces kept for _root.",
"concerns": [
"Reserved namespaces protected"
]
}
],
"concerns": [
{
"name": "Reserved namespaces protected",
"text": "The reserved namespaces, such as kappa/protocols, kappa/runtimes and kappa/os, are created only with _root authority.",
"model": "security"
}
],
"components": [
{
"name": "Protocol clients",
"text": "docker push, git push, aws s3, nix copy and XRPC clients, each speaking its native protocol to the one server.",
"kind": "externalSystem"
},
{
"name": "redb store",
"text": "state.redb: tags, edges, sequences, namespaces and epochs, which the auth checks query.",
"kind": "database"
}
],
"threats": [
{
"name": "Delegation asserted by a third party",
"text": "Someone other than the source writes a delegation edge on its behalf to grant themselves access.",
"stride": "spoofing",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "medium",
"impact": "critical",
"control": {
"name": "Source must assert",
"text": "A delegation counts only if its asserter is its source.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "review",
"reference": "crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs check_delegation_inner"
},
{
"kind": "gate",
"reference": "crates/kappa-server/tests/integration/delegation.rs"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Unbounded delegation walk",
"text": "A long or cyclic delegation chain makes authorization walk without end or grants access far down a chain.",
"stride": "denialOfService",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"control": {
"name": "Five hops",
"text": "The walk stops after hop 5, and beyond it nothing is permitted, proved for every request.",
"evidence": [
{
"kind": "proof",
"reference": "KappaDominanceProofs::inv002Holds"
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "Fail-open on an edge query error",
"text": "Step 3's edge query for an unclaimed namespace answers Allowed when the store errors.",
"stride": "elevationOfPrivilege",
"asset": "request",
"likelihood": "low",
"impact": "major",
"accepted": "The app models a store error as indeterminate; auth.rs step 3 allows on an edge-query error, a fail-open recorded here for the repository to review."
}
],
"quality": [
{
"characteristic": "Security",
"subcharacteristic": "Resistance",
"requirement": "No authority, no write",
"text": "No read, write or admin of a claimed namespace is permitted without an owner, capability, role or delegation within five hops.",
"measure": "Unauthorized permits",
"measureText": "Requests with no grant on a claimed namespace answered permit.",
"threshold": 0
}
],
"journeys": [
{
"stakeholder": "Namespace owner",
"steps": [
"REQ-009",
"REQ-010",
"otherwise",
"INV-001",
"INV-002"
]
},
{
"stakeholder": "Registry operator",
"steps": [
"REQ-003",
"REQ-005",
"REQ-007",
"INV-003"
]
}
],
"axioms": {
"inv003Holds": [
"Classical.choice",
"Quot.sound",
"propext"
],
"inv004Holds": [
"Classical.choice",
"Quot.sound",
"propext"
]
},
"license": "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
}
model/ids.toml 65 lines
# model/ids.toml --- the conformance ID register.
#
# Every ID this repository claims, in one place, so that nothing is referenced
# without being defined. `CONFORMANCE.md` is generated from this file. A test
# whose name ends in an ID not listed here fails `check-model`, and an ID listed
# here with no scenario and no test fails it too (CM-02).
#
# `level` is the honesty level (R2):
# some-true a fact reproduced from an authority; not established here
# build constructed here and validated against its oracle
# open measured and reported, never asserted
#
# Every row here has a scenario in `features/suites/` and a test whose name ends
# in the ID, lowercased with underscores (R3, CM-02). There is no "pending"
# state: a capability that is not built does not get a row, and every row in this
# file is built.
#
# The first row is the template's own Prism application in `app/` (TC-01).
# A capability starts with a row here; `just new-capability` writes the row,
# its scenario and its failing test in the order `AGENTS.md` sets out.
spec = "template/1"
[[id]]
id = "NA-01"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "The app never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none"
[[id]]
id = "NA-02"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "The app never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt"
[[id]]
id = "NA-03"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "The app never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt"
[[id]]
id = "NA-04"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "The app always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt"
[[id]]
id = "NA-05"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references"
[[id]]
id = "NA-06"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared"
[[id]]
id = "NA-07"
level = "build"
suite = "namespace_authorization"
statement = "Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence"
features/suites/namespace_authorization.feature 44 lines
Feature: namespace_authorization
This repository's Prism application, in app/, generated by prism-code from its
spec: Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes.
@NA-01 @build
Scenario: The app never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none
Given the model in app/src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv001Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv001
@NA-02 @build
Scenario: The app never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt
Given the model in app/src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv002Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv002
@NA-03 @build
Scenario: The app never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt
Given the model in app/src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv003Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv003
@NA-04 @build
Scenario: The app always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt
Given the model in app/src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks inv004Holds during prismpm verify
Then no request meets breaksInv004
@NA-05 @build
Scenario: The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references
Given the model in app/src/Architecture.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks architectureDescriptionHolds during prismpm verify
Then the architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references
@NA-06 @build
Scenario: The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared
Given the model in app/src/Quality.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks qualityModelHolds during prismpm verify
Then the ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared
@NA-07 @build
Scenario: Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
Given the model in app/src/Compliance.lex.tex
When the Lean kernel checks everyObligationEvidenced during prismpm verify
Then every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
crates/conformance/tests/namespace_authorization.rs 132 lines
//! The `namespace_authorization` suite: one test per scenario in `features/suites/namespace_authorization.feature`.
//!
//! Written by the Prism-DevRel builder from the app's prompt. The theorems are
//! checked by the Lean kernel when `just vv` runs `prismpm verify` on `app/`.
//! What these tests hold fixed is what each theorem is about, so a weakened
//! statement that still verifies fails the gate.
use std::path::PathBuf;
fn root() -> PathBuf {
PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
.ancestors()
.nth(2)
.expect("crates/conformance is two below the root")
.to_path_buf()
}
/// The body of the top-level declaration named `name`, up to its closing brace.
fn declaration<'a>(model: &'a str, name: &str) -> &'a str {
let start = model
.find(&format!("\n name: {name},\n"))
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{name} is not declared"));
let end = model[start..]
.find("\n}\n")
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{name} is not closed"));
&model[start..start + end]
}
fn module(path: &str) -> String {
std::fs::read_to_string(root().join(path)).expect("the module")
}
/// The condition no request may meet, and the theorem that says none does.
fn pinned(breaks: &str, condition: &str, theorem: &str) {
let model = module("app/src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex");
let found = declaration(&model, breaks);
assert!(
found.contains(condition),
"the condition of {breaks} changed:\n{found}"
);
let holds = declaration(&model, theorem);
let statement = format!("statement: (({breaks} request) = false),");
assert!(
holds.contains(&statement),
"{theorem} must state that no request meets {breaks}:\n{holds}"
);
}
/// A facet theorem: proved by `decide`, about exactly this predicate.
fn holds(path: &str, theorem: &str, statement: &str) {
let model = module(path);
let found = declaration(&model, theorem);
assert!(
found.contains(&format!("statement: {statement},")),
"{theorem} must state {statement}:\n{found}"
);
assert!(
found.contains("proof: decide{}"),
"{theorem} is proved by decide"
);
}
/// `NA-01`: The app never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_01() {
pinned(
"breaksInv001",
"body: ((((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opRead))) && ((project request target) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting))) && ((project request grant) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::grantNone))) && ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit)))",
"inv001Holds",
);
}
/// `NA-02`: The app never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_02() {
pinned(
"breaksInv002",
"body: (((((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request target) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::targetExisting))) && ((project request grant) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::grantDelegated))) && (5 <? (project request hops))) && (not ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt)))) && ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit)))",
"inv002Holds",
);
}
/// `NA-03`: The app never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_03() {
pinned(
"breaksInv003",
"body: ((((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request target) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::targetReserved))) && (not ((project request grant) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::grantRoot)))) && (not ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt)))) && ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerPermit)))",
"inv003Holds",
);
}
/// `NA-04`: The app always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_04() {
pinned(
"breaksInv004",
"body: (((((((((project request op) <? 4) && ((project request store) <? 2)) && ((project request target) <? 5)) && ((project request grant) <? 7)) && ((project request hops) <=? 10)) && ((project request store) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::storeError))) && (not ((project request op) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::opExempt)))) && (not ((NamespaceAuthorization::judge request) =? (NamespaceAuthorization::answerIndeterminate))))",
"inv004Holds",
);
}
/// `NA-05`: The architecture description declares every stakeholder, concern, component, edge, viewpoint and view it references
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_05() {
holds(
"app/src/Architecture.lex.tex",
"architectureDescriptionHolds",
"((architectureValid) = true)",
);
}
/// `NA-06`: The ISO/IEC 25010 quality model numbers every characteristic, subcharacteristic, requirement and measure, and every parent it names is declared
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_06() {
holds(
"app/src/Quality.lex.tex",
"qualityModelHolds",
"((qualityValid) = true)",
);
}
/// `NA-07`: Every compliance obligation is numbered in order and names its evidence
#[test]
fn namespace_authorization_na_07() {
holds(
"app/src/Compliance.lex.tex",
"everyObligationEvidenced",
"((obligationsEvidenced 0 (obligations)) = true)",
);
}
site/app.json 114 lines
{
"name": "Namespace authorization",
"shortName": "Namespace",
"live": "https://uor-foundation.github.io/kappa-registry/",
"purpose": "Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes. Send op, store, target, grant or hops, separated by spaces; it answers permit, deny, not-applicable or indeterminate, and invalid request for anything else.",
"inputLabel": "Request: op store target grant hops",
"placeholder": "read ok existing owner 0",
"submitLabel": "Decide",
"outputLabel": "Answer",
"answers": {
"positive": [
"permit"
],
"negative": [
"deny",
"not-applicable",
"indeterminate"
],
"refusal": "invalid request"
},
"promise": {
"headline": "Says conformant exactly when every policy file matches its lock.",
"detail": "Each of the six universal policy files is compared with the digest the lock records, and any file that drifted is named."
},
"claim": "NA-01: the app never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none. NA-02: the app never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt. NA-03: the app never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt. NA-04: the app always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt.",
"proposition": {
"name": "judge",
"text": "judge request :=\n op is exempt → permit\n store is error → indeterminate\n grant is root → permit\n target is none → permit\n target is reserved → deny\n target is absent and op is read → not-applicable\n target is absent → permit\n target is unclaimed → permit\n grant is not none and grant is not delegated → permit\n grant is delegated and hops is at most 5 → permit\n otherwise → deny",
"plain": "Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes."
},
"theorems": [
{
"name": "inv001Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv001: the app never answers permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex"
},
{
"name": "inv002Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv002: the app never answers permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex"
},
{
"name": "inv003Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv003: the app never answers permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex"
},
{
"name": "inv004Holds",
"statement": "no request meets breaksInv004: the app always answers indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt",
"how": "Proved by linear arithmetic, checked by the Lean kernel on the UOR MCP server and again by prismpm verify in CI",
"where": "app/src/NamespaceAuthorizationProofs.lex.tex"
}
],
"pinned": [
{
"name": "namespace_authorization_na_01",
"what": "NA-01's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/namespace_authorization.rs"
},
{
"name": "namespace_authorization_na_02",
"what": "NA-02's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/namespace_authorization.rs"
},
{
"name": "namespace_authorization_na_03",
"what": "NA-03's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/namespace_authorization.rs"
},
{
"name": "namespace_authorization_na_04",
"what": "NA-04's condition and the theorem that no request meets it. A string-matching test, not a theorem: a planted defect fails it.",
"where": "crates/conformance/tests/namespace_authorization.rs"
}
],
"trusted": [
{
"name": "SDK image",
"value": "the digest prismpm.lock pins; see the bootstrap workflow's log"
},
{
"name": "Lean toolchain",
"value": "leanprover/lean4:v4.32.1"
},
{
"name": "LexLean compiler semantics",
"value": "5262e5b4c8b5668ae7066ad686757a6bb7f80c941d515fb9d586894fbc7de69a"
},
{
"name": "prism-code runtime, vendored",
"value": "0.2.0, see try/vendor/prism-code/VENDOR.md"
},
{
"name": "Your browser",
"value": "runs the WebAssembly guest and this page"
}
],
"attestations": {
"proof": {
"id": "not recorded: the proof ran in the SDK image, not on the UOR MCP server",
"url": "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry/actions/workflows/bootstrap.yml"
},
"build": {
"id": "printed by prismpm verify in every pages run",
"url": "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry/actions/workflows/pages.yml"
}
},
"repository": "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry",
"report": "https://github.com/UOR-Foundation/kappa-registry/blob/main/TEMPLATE-VERIFICATION.md"
}
openspec/specs/namespace-authorization/spec.md 247 lines
# namespace-authorization Specification
<!-- Generated by Prism from prism/spec.json. Change the app through your agent with /prism, not by editing this file. -->
## Purpose
Namespace authorization: Decide, as an XACML policy decision, whether an operation on a namespace is permitted, from the operation class, whether the store answered, what the target namespace is, the authority the asserter holds and the delegation hops it takes.
## Requirements
### Requirement: Never permit when op is read and target is existing and grant is none
The app SHALL NOT answer `permit` when op is read and target is existing and grant is none, because a claimed namespace is never read without authority.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-001, theorem `inv001Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-001 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok existing none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL NOT be `permit`
- **AND** the app answers `deny`, decided by the fallback
### Requirement: Never permit when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt
The app SHALL NOT answer `permit` when target is existing and grant is delegated and hops is above 5 and op is not exempt, because the delegation walk is bounded at five hops.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-002, theorem `inv002Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-002 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `write ok existing delegated 6` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL NOT be `permit`
- **AND** the app answers `deny`, decided by the fallback
### Requirement: Never permit when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt
The app SHALL NOT answer `permit` when target is reserved and grant is not root and op is not exempt, because a reserved namespace needs _root authority.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-003, theorem `inv003Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-003 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `admin ok reserved none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL NOT be `permit`
- **AND** the app answers `deny`, decided by REQ-005
### Requirement: Always indeterminate when store is error and op is not exempt
The app SHALL answer `indeterminate` when store is error and op is not exempt, because a store error never becomes a permit or a deny.
Verified: to be proved by Lean for every request (INV-004, theorem `inv004Holds`).
#### Scenario: INV-004 holds
- **WHEN** the request is `read error existing owner 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `indeterminate`
- **AND** the app answers `indeterminate`, decided by REQ-002
### Requirement: REQ-001 permit when op is exempt
The app SHALL answer `permit` when op is exempt, because crates/kappa-server/src/auth.rs authorize: an Exempt operation is Allowed before any check.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule1`).
#### Scenario: REQ-001 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `exempt error none none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-001
### Requirement: REQ-002 indeterminate when store is error
The app SHALL answer `indeterminate` when store is error and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs: a store error in the delegation walk is AuthError::Store, not a decision.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule2`).
#### Scenario: REQ-002 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `read error existing owner 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `indeterminate`, decided by REQ-002
### Requirement: REQ-003 permit when grant is root
The app SHALL answer `permit` when grant is root and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs step 1: a capability on _root allows any namespace.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule3`).
#### Scenario: REQ-003 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok existing root 0`
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-003
### Requirement: REQ-004 permit when target is none
The app SHALL answer `permit` when target is none and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs: ResolvedNamespace::NoNamespace is Allowed.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule4`).
#### Scenario: REQ-004 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok none none 0`
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-004
### Requirement: REQ-005 deny when target is reserved
The app SHALL answer `deny` when target is reserved and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs: an absent reserved namespace requires _root authority.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule5`).
#### Scenario: REQ-005 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `admin ok reserved none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `deny`, decided by REQ-005
### Requirement: REQ-006 not-applicable when target is absent and op is read
The app SHALL answer `not-applicable` when target is absent and op is read and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs: reading an absent namespace is AuthError::NotFound.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule6`).
#### Scenario: REQ-006 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok absent none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `not-applicable`, decided by REQ-006
### Requirement: REQ-007 permit when target is absent
The app SHALL answer `permit` when target is absent and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs: a write to an absent non-reserved namespace is AllowCreateNew, first writer claims.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule7`).
#### Scenario: REQ-007 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `write ok absent none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-007
### Requirement: REQ-008 permit when target is unclaimed
The app SHALL answer `permit` when target is unclaimed and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs step 3: a non-reserved namespace with no capability edges is open.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule8`).
#### Scenario: REQ-008 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok unclaimed none 0`
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-008
### Requirement: REQ-009 permit when grant is not none and grant is not delegated
The app SHALL answer `permit` when grant is not none and grant is not delegated and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs steps 2, 4, 5 and 6: owner, direct capability, parent namespace or held role.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule9`).
#### Scenario: REQ-009 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok existing owner 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-009
### Requirement: REQ-010 permit when grant is delegated and hops is at most 5
The app SHALL answer `permit` when grant is delegated and hops is at most 5 and no earlier rule matches, because auth.rs check_delegation_inner: a delegation chain counts up to hop 5, AllowedViaDelegation.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors (`rule10`).
#### Scenario: REQ-010 decides
- **WHEN** the request is `write ok existing delegated 5` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `permit`, decided by REQ-010
### Requirement: Otherwise deny
The app SHALL answer `deny` when no rule matches, because auth.rs: no authority found, Forbidden access denied.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors.
#### Scenario: No rule matches
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok existing none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `deny`
### Requirement: The first matching rule decides
The app SHALL try REQ-001, REQ-002, REQ-003, REQ-004, REQ-005, REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-008, REQ-009, REQ-010 in that order, and the first rule that matches SHALL decide.
Verified: tested by the acceptance vectors.
#### Scenario: Two rules match
- **WHEN** the request is `read ok absent none 0` (an acceptance example)
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `not-applicable`, decided by REQ-006, the earlier rule
### Requirement: Request and answers
The app SHALL read one request as one line of 5 fields separated by single spaces, in this order, and SHALL answer exactly one of `permit`, `deny`, `not-applicable`, `indeterminate`, or `invalid` for anything else.
| Field | Accepts | Means |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `op` | `exempt`, `read`, `write`, `admin` | the operation class |
| `store` | `ok`, `error` | whether the store answered the delegation walk |
| `target` | `existing`, `unclaimed`, `absent`, `reserved`, `none` | the namespace: claimed, existing with no capability edges, absent, absent and reserved, or none |
| `grant` | `none`, `root`, `owner`, `direct`, `parent`, `role`, `delegated` | the first authority the asserter holds, in authorize's order |
| `hops` | whole number from 0 up to 10 | delegation hops walked to a capability holder |
| Answer | Means |
| --- | --- |
| `permit` | Allowed, AllowCreateNew or AllowedViaDelegation |
| `deny` | Forbidden: access denied, or a reserved namespace needs _root authority |
| `not-applicable` | NotFound: a read of a namespace that does not exist |
| `indeterminate` | a store error during the auth check, so no decision is made |
| `invalid` | the request is malformed |
Verified: reading a request is tested, not proved.
#### Scenario: A malformed request is invalid
- **WHEN** the request is not 5 fields in this order
- **THEN** the answer SHALL be `invalid`
## Out of scope
- It does not resolve namespaces or walk edges; it decides from the authority the walk found.
- The redb store and the identity system are outside it.
## Examples
- `read ok existing owner 0` gives `permit`
- `read ok existing none 0` gives `deny`
- `write ok absent none 0` gives `permit`
- `read ok absent none 0` gives `not-applicable`
- `admin ok reserved none 0` gives `deny`
- `write ok existing delegated 5` gives `permit`
- `write ok existing delegated 6` gives `deny`
- `read error existing owner 0` gives `indeterminate`
- `exempt error none none 0` gives `permit`
## What is proved and what is tested
Lean proves each property marked proved above, for every request that decodes, with no exceptions and no sampling. The proof is about `judge`, the function the WebAssembly guest runs, because both come from the same model.
The parsing of requests is tested, not proved: the acceptance vectors in the app replay through the built guest, including malformed and oversized requests.
Nothing here says the rules are the right rules. That is the part only you can judge.
## Files
- `prism/spec.json` is this spec as data.
- `src/NamespaceAuthorization.lex.tex` is the LexLean model generated from it. It is the single source of the app.
Words on this page 7
- record
- One entry in a facet: a component, a threat, a measure or a journey step, with the place in the source it came from.
- Lean kernel
- The small checker at the heart of the Lean prover. It accepts a proof only if every step follows the rules.
- theorem
- A statement about the model that the Lean kernel has checked, so it holds for every input, not only the ones tested.
- SDK
- Software development kit. Here, the PrismPM container image that builds, checks and verifies Prism models.
- κ
- A content address: a hash of the exact bytes a record was read from, so anyone can check where it came from.
- stakeholder
- A person or group with an interest in the system, as ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 defines it.
- XACML
- OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 3.0: a policy decides permit, deny, not applicable or indeterminate.